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The irony of the title of this piece is, of course, that charitable trusts
enjoy a longer lineage than the legal form dominant in the United States,
the nonprofit corporation. Yet the recognition that charities in this country
can take the trust form seems to have either escaped the notice of, or per-
haps intimidates, those who study how to improve the governance of non-
profit organizations.) We thus find, for example, recommended best
practices as to how many directors a nonprofit should have on its board, or
the functioning of audit and compensation committees made up of inde-
pendent directors. Policy makers, too, appear to seek to impose elaborate
requirements for the governance of nonprofit corporations, while yielding
the field, seemingly without regret, to the possibility of less formalized
governance structures, including a single charitable trustee.
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* Professor of Law and Freehling Scholar, 2002-2004, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I am
grateful for support from the Norman and Edna Freehling Endowment Fund and from the Marshall S
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1. While we do not know how many charities today are trusts and how many are corporations,
the percentage of trusts is assumed to be small. Section 501(c)(3) makes no distinction between chari-
ties based on their organizational form. While the IRS Form 990 does not report organizational form, an
informal survey of the IRS Master File database of active Code § 501(c)(3) organizations (other than
churches and private foundations) indicates that out of nearly 650,000 total charities, 508,879 are
corporations; 12,422 are trusts; and 121,948 are associations. See E-mail from Peggy Riley, Statistician,
IRS Statistics of Income Division, to Evelyn Brady (Jan. 10, 2005, 15:07 CST) (on file with author).
Note that churches and small public charities (receipts of normally not more than $5,000) do not have to
register with the IRS. I.R.C. § 508(c)(1) (2000).
2. See, e.g., N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, INTERNAL CONTROLS AND FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT BOARDS (May 2004), at www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/int-
emal_controls.pdf. This document begins:
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More ironically, at the same time we commonly use the term "trustee-
ship" to describe what it is that the board of a charity does. Indeed, direc-
tors of nonprofit corporations (at least those that are charities) are
frequently called "trustees"-either under their state law, their organic
documents, or colloquially (including such references by courts, regulators,
practitioners, and the press). The common use of the term suggests that we
know what we mean by trusteeship. Granted, in the private trust context,
the notion of trusteeship has an accepted content, but private trustees
merely administer rather than govern. Terminology can affect behavior:
For example, Henry Hansmann worries that "if a university trustee asks
herself what she is a 'trustee' of, she might naturally conclude that... she
is a trustee of the endowment fund and that it follows that she has a special
responsibility to make certain that the fund is retained intact."
3
Trust law does appropriately dictate specific aspects of the governance
of charities, whether trust or corporate. The definition of charity set forth in
the Restatement of the Law of Trusts controls across the board, from in-
heritance disputes to federal tax law. 4 Investment activity by corporate
charities is easily analogized to that of trusts. When it comes to enforcing
restrictions on gifts--even those made to corporate charities-regulators
and courts commonly apply charitable trust doctrines. These include the
authority of the state attorney general to enforce the restriction, and the
application of the judicial powers of cy pres and deviation when a modifi-
cation of the restriction is sought. Indeed, some regulators and courts apply
trust doctrine to a corporate charity seeking to change its charitable
purpose.5
New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer is pleased to offer this booklet to assist
current and future boards of directors and officers of New York not-for-profit corporations
(and by analogy, trustees of New York charitable trusts and other charitable entities) to under-
stand and carry out their fiduciary responsibilities to the organizations they serve.
Id.
3. Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 39 (1990).
4. See Treas. Reg- § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2004) ("The term charitable is used in section
501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by the
separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad
outlines of charity as developed by judicial decisions.") (emphasis in original); see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-
545, 1969-2C.B. 117, 118:
In the general law of charity, the promotion of health is considered to be a charitable purpose.
Restatement (Second), Trusts, sec. 368 and sec. 372; IV Scott on Trusts (3rd ed. 1967), sec.
368 and sec. 372- A nonprofit organization whose purpose and activity are providing hospital
care is promoting health and may, therefore, qualify as organized and operated in furtherance
of a charitable purpose. If it meets the other requirements of section 501(c)(3) of the Code, it
will qualify for exemption from Federal income tax under section 501 (a).
5. While both charitable trusts and corporate charities must honor restrictions on gifts, the rules
for change of purpose might differ. See Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. ch. 4
(Council Draft No. 1, Oct. 2, 2003) [hereinafter ALI, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1]. The trust
form offers a default requirement to apply to a court for deviation or cy pres in order to modify a re-
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In spite of the almost unreflecting invocation of trust law concepts,
however, recent and ongoing legal reform projects have not focused on
those governance structures and procedures that should apply to trustees of
charitable trusts, or on how trust doctrine should apply to corporate gov-
ernance.6 In particular, if the law tightens up the requirements for corporate
charity governance without addressing charitable trusts, we will likely find
charities adopting (or switching to) the trust form in order to avoid re-
quirements newly imposed on nonprofit corporations.
7
By continuing to make distinctions based on organizational form
rather than structure and operations, moreover, we might be asking the
wrong questions. To what extent do trusts and corporations have irreduci-
ble legal differences? Instead, does it make better sense to classify charities
by a metric other than legal form? Consider-
A. Separate Entity
Under the traditional common law, a trust is not an entity-rather, a
trust is viewed as a relationship between the settlor and the trustee to use
specific property for a designated purpose. By contrast, the fiduciaries of a
corporate charity are separate from the legal personality of the charity.
Accordingly, for example, a corporate charity could be liable for a breach
striction, while the corporate form generally offers greater board autonomy to adjust to unanticipated
circumstances (with protection for restricted gifts). See id. at § 240 (Change in Charitable Purpose);
§ 245 (Consequences of Change in Charitable Purpose); § 430 (Procedures When Circumstances Re-
quire Modification of a Restriction); § 440 (Proceeding to Modify a Restriction (Deviation and Cy
Pres). See generally Evelyn Brody, The Legal Framework for Restricted Gifts: The Cy Pres Doctrine
and Corporate Charities (Apr. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For more discussion
of the regimes applying to charities of different legal forms, see Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity
Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400 (1998). See also Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The
Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. Sct. L. REV.
457 (1996); Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV. 433
(1996); Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
873 (1997).
6. See the Uniform Trust Code (2000); a major rewriting of the Uniform Management of Institu-
tional Funds Act (final reading postponed until no earlier than 2005); proposed changes to the Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, and enacted revisions to the California nonprofit corporation statute
and proposed revisions in New York and Massachusetts, discussed in Dana Brakman Reiser, There
Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559 (2005). See also the ongoing Restatement (Third) of Trusts project, which has
so far issue final volumes in 1992 and 2003; see extended discussion, below, of Council Draft No. 4
(Nov. 10, 2004). See also proposals for reform in the United Kingdom, discussed in Debra Morris, New
Charity Regulation Proposals for England and Wales: Overdue or Overdone?, 80 CHI.-KENT L, REV.
779 (2005).
7. Cf LARRY E. RJBSTEJN, WHY CORPORATIONS? 2 (1I. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper No. 03-11, Sept. 25, 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.con/sol3/papers.cfmab-
stractid=451060 (arguing, in the business-organization context, that "new corporate tax rules, in-
creased federal regulation of corporate governance and the changing nature of U.S business may give
firms new incentives to use the partnership form").
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of contract or a tort even if the corporate directors have not breached their
fiduciary duties to the charity. To a large degree, as described next, this
difference is minimized by the trust settlor-and more recently in such
modem statutes as the Uniform Trust Code, which offers statutory protec-
tion for trustees against claims by third parties similar to that for corporate
directors as well as in modem common law.
8
B. To Whom the Duty Is Owed
Charitable trustees owe their duty to the "charitable purpose"; corpo-
rate directors owe their duty to the corporation. Are these statements differ-
ent? While some observers seek a legal obligation for charity fiduciaries to
further social goals even at the expense of a given charity, it should not
make a legal difference whether duties are owed to the charitable purpose
or to the charity itself. In either case, the fiduciaries must interpret that
purpose in light of settlor or donor instruction, but are otherwise free to
exercise their discretion. What the trust approach should not suggest,
though, is that general societal interests, or charitable goals extraneous to
the charity, override the fiduciaries' good faith interpretation of the char-
ity's mission.9
C. Fiduciary Standards
It is a common belief that the fiduciary duties imposed on trustees are
"stricter" than those imposed on corporate directors. At the same time, the
"rules" of a trust are generally determined by the settlor. For example, in
general the settlor of a trust may relax fiduciary standards, and may excul-
pate the trustee from liability for breach of fiduciary duties. Moreover, a
charity settlor appears to have as much freedom to modify fiduciary stan-
8. Commentary in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts states:
Increasingly, modem common-law and statutory concepts and terminology tacitly rec-
ognize the trust as a legal "entity," consisting of the trust estate and the associated fiduciary
relation between the trustee and the beneficiaries. This is increasingly and appropriately re-
flected both in language (referring, for example, to the duties or liability of a trustee to "the
trust") and in doctrine, especially in distinguishing between the trustee personally or as an in-
dividual and the trustee in a fiduciary or representative capacity.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (Definition of Trust) cmt. a (Terminology) & rptr's notes on § 2
cmt. i (2003). See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1010 (Limitation on Personal Liability of Trustee) (2003). As
clarified in the Comment, this section "does not excuse any liability the trustee may have for breach of
trust." Id. § 1010 cmt.
9. Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 310 (Duty of Loyalty), at 25
(Council Draft No. 2, Nov. 18, 2004) [hereinafter ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2] ("Satisfy-
ing the duty of loyalty requires the board member to act in a manner that the board member reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the charitable purposes of the organization."). See also id. § 310
cmt. a (To whom are fiduciary duties owed?), at 25-26.
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dards as does the settlor of a private trust. While a corporation exists only
as provided for in a statute, many corporate requirements are also only
default rules that can be overridden by the corporate charter or bylaws. In
practical effect, drafters of trust instruments and corporate organic docu-
ments can achieve much the same results. Importantly, both trust and cor-
porate law demands certain minimum fiduciary standards that cannot be
waived or exculpated, and these minimum fiduciary standards seem to be
the same for both charity trustees and directors.
D. Number of Fiduciaries/Size of Board
A trust, even a charitable trust, may have a single trustee. A trustee
(whether the sole trustee or a co-trustee) may be an individual or an entity
(e.g., a bank or another charity). A trustee may be any person, including the
settlor. The typical nonprofit corporation statute requires that the board of
directors consist of at least three persons (all individuals). 10 Some states-
notably Delaware (which does not have a separate statute for nonprofit
corporations)-permit a single director.I' A director may be the same per-
son as a major donor, and directors may be related to each other. Perhaps
the law might better distinguish charities with a single trustee or director
(or very small boards) from charities-trust or corporate-with large, inde-
pendent boards.
E. Duty to Prevent Breach by Co-Fiduciaries
A trustee has a duty to prevent a breach of duty by a co-trustee. A co-
director also usually has standing to bring suit against a breaching co-
director. The traditional rule is fairly easy to apply in the context of a pri-
vate trust, whose trustees must only make prudent investments and appro-
priate distributions. In the case of a charity-trust or corporate-it is not
clear how this duty operates in the context of governance, rather than mere
administration. Most worrisome is the prospect of a suit for breach of the
duty of care brought by an outvoted fiduciary. The duty to prevent breach
might best apply one way with regard to explicit donor directions (and
perhaps to investments) in both charitable trusts and nonprofit corporations,
and another way to charitable trusts and nonprofit corporations with regard
to the governance decisions made in running an operating charity.
10. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.02 (1987) (members of a corporate board
must be individuals) [hereinafter RMNCA]; id. § 8.03 (requiring a minimum of three directors).
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(b) (Michie Supp. 2004) ("The board of directors of a corporation




In sum, key issues that initially appear unique to trust law on closer
inspection turn out to apply to some or all corporate charities, and corporate
doctrine might be more appropriate for charitable trusts having an inde-
pendent governing board of a certain minimum size. In the end, the distinc-
tion between "trust law" and "corporate law" might make less sense than
identifying what legal principles of governance should apply to charities
with multiple, independent fiduciaries, and what (if any) different legal
principles should apply to charities governed by only a single fiduciary, or
a small number of fiduciaries (particularly if they are related).
1. CHOICE OF LEGAL FORM FOR CHARITY
American law allows for a variety of forms for engaging in charitable
activity. These forms might or might not carry different legal conse-
quences, as described below. Creators of a new charity can generally
choose between two basic regimes: the nonprofit corporation and the chari-
table trust. 12 Preference in this country for the corporate form began with
the nineteenth-century uncertainty over the validity of charitable trusts. 13 In
practice, it must be admitted, rarely does the organizer of a charity care-
fully consider the legal differences and make a choice based on the advan-
tages of organizational form. 14 American advisers routinely recommend the
nonprofit corporate form, although the trust form might be particularly
appropriate for a charity (such as a grantmaking foundation) that manages a
fund of money and makes designated distributions. As described below, the
technical differences between the trust and corporate form for charity are,
in practice, minimized by action by the creators and by the existence of
12. Informal or other unincorporated voluntary associations, which traditionally function under
the laws of agency and partnership, could expose the participants to personal liability, but the limited
liability company form might become popular.
13. See generally MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 37-38 (1965)
[hereinafter FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT] (describing how, following the
Revolution, some states repealed all English statutes-including the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable
Uses-leading some courts to mistakenly believe that charitable trusts could not have been created at
common law); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION (2004) [hereinafter FEMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS]. See also NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE
OF THE MODERN NONPROFIT SECTOR (2001).
14. Institutional forces might be even more important than history: the professional training of
charity advisors (particularly attorneys) leads to conformity of organizational form. Today, filing a
certificate of incorporation for a nonprofit corporation is ordinarily just one item on the checklist for
setting up a new charity- If, however, the charity is established as part of a will, the estate lawyer might
pick the more familiar trust form- Moreover, trustees often incorporate after the initial trustees have
moved on.
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charity regulations-notably the requirements for federal tax exemption-
that apply regardless of organizational form. Fiduciary duties, too, are con-
forming to the corporate standard-under longstanding practice by draft-
ing, and more recently by law.
A. Differences in Creating and Maintaining Status
The process for constituting a charity varies by form. Traditionally,
the trust could be created wholly in the private sphere: A settlor makes an
agreement with a trustee for the management and disposition of a fund of
money or property. If the beneficiaries are indefinite and the trust has a
charitable purpose, the charitable purpose may exist in perpetuity. A chari-
table trust formed by will typically is filed with an equity court (sometimes
termed chancery court, probate court, surrogate's court, family court, or
widow's and orphan's court). A corporation, by contrast, requires the grant
of a legislative charter in order to obtain such characteristics as perpetual
life. Under modem nonprofit corporation law, corporate charities typically
obtain their certificate of incorporation from the state secretary of state's
office.
Once a charity has formed, it might have filing obligations. Testamen-
tary charitable trusts commonly file accounts with the court. A nonprofit
corporation, like other corporations, typically files an annual report with
the secretary of state that is usually quite perfunctory. In some states, addi-
tional registration and filing obligations depend on whether the charity is a
trust or a corporation, and the type of charity (e.g., churches or universities
might be exempt).' 5
Despite any state-level differences between trusts and corporations,
the federal tax regime imposes a uniform set of requirements on all chari-
ties regardless of organizational form. After all, while few charities are
chartered by Congress, most charities desire tax-favored treatment for
themselves and for their contributors. Once a charity obtains recognition of
federal income-tax exemption under Internal Revenue Code section
501(c)(3), the charity must make publicly available its exemption applica-
tion-which includes organizing documents (whether articles of incorpora-
15. Some states require charities to make filings with the attorney general. FREMONT-SMITH,
GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13, at 315-17. Sometimes, as in the Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act, the attorney general's enhanced supervisory role is limited to corporate
charities, such as when they seek to engage in an extraordinary transaction, such as a merger, liquida-
tion, or sale of all of the assets. See id. at 318-21. More commonly, those charities that solicit charitable
contributions are subject to a separate registration and reporting regime. See id. at 370-74. Finally,
charities operating in specific industries might be subject to the oversight of such government agencies
as the Department of Education or the Commissioner on Insurance. See id. at 364-70.
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tion, trust instrument, constitution, or other)-as well as its annual tax fil-
ings. 16 Nevertheless, governance differences based on organizational form
apparently exist: The Internal Revenue Service, despite the absence of spe-
cific authority, reportedly conditions recognition of charity exemption on
such indicators of good governance as a minimum of three members (or
even more) of the governing board, 17 but the Service evidently applies no
such minimum to charitable trusts.
B. Overview ofApplication of Trust Law to Nonprofit Corporations
A separate question from the procedures that attend the choice of or-
ganizational form is the substantive legal effect of this choice. As described
in the drafts of the American Law Institute's project on Principles of the
Law of Nonprofit Organizations, legal form does not automatically lead to
divergent legal results. Indeed, the draft Principles specify issue-by-issue
where they apply equally to all charities regardless of their organizational
form, or, by contrast, where different results obtain for charitable trusts and
for nonprofit corporation charities. Among the most important potential
differences between charitable trusts and nonprofit charitable corporations
are fiduciary standards and consequences for breach; the definition of char-
ity, and the degree of decisional autonomy for the governing board over
restricted gifts and charitable purposes; and supervisory regimes. In these
three important areas, however, trust and corporate law have been conform-
ing, with the general result that corporate standards of loyalty and care are
being applied to fiduciaries, whether trustees or directors; trust doctrine is
being applied to changes in restrictions on gifts; and regulators have the
same enforcement powers regardless of organizational form. 18
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which is being drafted and issued
as portions are completed, does not contain a comprehensive statement
addressing the application of trust law to corporate charities. 19 The Re-
16. I.R.C. § 6104(d) (2000).
17. The Service also reportedly looks for a certain percentage of independent directors to balance
the directors who are financially interested or related. See, e.g., IRS Exemption Denial Letter
20044033E (Apr. 5, 2004), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File as 2004 TNT 201-47 (Oct.
18, 2004) ("Since all three members of your original board were related and receiving compensation,
we asked you to expand your board of directors by three to four non-related members of the commu-
nity."). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1 70A-9(e)(3)(v) (2004) (For nonprivate foundation status under the
"10-percent facts and circumstances test," the IRS will take into account the "fact that an organization
has a governing body which represents the broad interests of the public.").
18. See ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 5, § 200 (Choice of Form) gen.
cmts., at 14-16.
19. Final volumes of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts have been published in 1992 (covering
prudent investing) and in 2003 (in two volumes covering, among other topics, the nature and types of
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statement (Second) of Trusts declared generally that "[o]rdinarily the prin-
ciples and rules applicable to charitable trusts are applicable to charitable
corporations." 20 The Second Restatement's comment also observed:
On the other hand, some of the rules applicable to charitable trusts
are not applicable to charitable corporations. Thus, if property is be-
queathed to a charitable corporation, the income to be used for one of its
charitable purposes, it is not subject to a statutory rule requiring account-
ings in a probate court which is applicable to charitable trusts. So also,
where a liability is incurred to a third person in the carrying out of the
charitable purpose, the remedy of the third person, if charities are not
immune from liability, is different in the case of a charitable corporation
from what it is in the case of a charitable trust; in the case of a charitable
corporation an action can be maintained against the corporation, whereas
in the case of a charitable trust the property can be reached, if at all, only
through an action against the trustees. See §§ 402, 403. So also, the
founder of a charitable corporation may have a visitorial power which is
not applicable to charitable trusts.
21
As to governance, the most basic formal distinction is that in the tradi-
tional charitable trust, no separation exists between oversight and manage-
ment. Trustees owe fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, whereas corporate
directors owe their duties to the corporation; however, in the case of a
charitable trust, which generally cannot have ascertainable beneficiaries
who can enforce their rights, the duty is instead said to run to the charitable
purpose.22 In addition, because formally the trust is not an entity separate
from the trustee, a suit by a third party would be brought against the trus-
tee. When the charitable trustee governs an ongoing charitable program
rather than just administers a fund for limited purposes, fiduciary liability is
of particular concern. An entity approach to the charitable trust permits a
separation of the obligations of the charity to third parties from the obliga-
tions of the fiduciaries to the charity. 23 Ensuring that liability falls on the
trusts, the definition of charity (§ 28), and the doctrines of cy pres (§ 67) and equitable deviation
(§ 66)). Discussion of the current draft of additional provisions is set forth below.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TRUSTS, § 348 cnt.f(1959).
21. Id.
22. In the context of a charitable trust, the draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts declares:
Although the commentary hereafter often refers only to trust "beneficiaries," the Section and
commentary apply to charitable as well as private trusts, with the power to avoid transactions
or to seek other relief residing in the appropriate attorney general or others having standing to
enforce the trust (§ 94).
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 78 (Duty of Loyalty) gen. cmt. a (The trustee and the trust relation-
ship), at 157 (Council Draft No. 4, Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council
Draft No. 4] (emphasis in original). See also ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2, supra note 9,
§ 310 (Duty of Loyalty) cmt. a (To whom are fiduciary duties owed?), at 25 (combining the corporate
and trust approaches to require the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the charitable purposes of the
organization).
23. Recognizing that some courts have applied trust law to directors of nonprofit corporations, the
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act declares that a "director shall not be deemed to be a trustee
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trust and not the trustee is accomplished (for a private as well as a charita-
ble trust) by requiring suit to be brought against the trustee in his or her
representative capacity; personal liability to a third party results only if the
trustee entered into a contract without disclosing that capacity or was per-
sonally at fault in committing a tort.
24
An even more basic question than whether trust law should apply to
the governance of charitable trusts (and possibly to corporations) is the
appropriateness of the charitable trust form for anything but the most basic
grantmaking fund. As described below, many charitable trusts operate with
a board of trustees and employ a structure that separates governance from
management. 25 Consider the recent court-ordered restructuring of the mas-
sive Hawaiian charity, the Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate ("KSBE").
The probate court directed the trustees, among other things, to terminate
their "lead-trustee" governance system and to institute a CEO-based man-
agement system. Notably, the court observed that two of the five trustees
favored a CEO-based management system, but the majority trustees vio-
lated KSBE's stipulation with the Attorney General and the Special Master
to establish this structure.26 As Professor Edward Halbach commented on
the operation of KSBE:
[B]oards of directors, regents, or trustees of hospitals, universities, librar-
ies, and the like regularly are responsible not only for the management
and expenditure of endowment funds but also for the active operation of
public or quasi-public institutions. Activities conducted in the traditional
form of express charitable and private trusts, however, and to which the
trust law is primarily directed, are usually confined (as KSBE trustees'
duties are not) to investment and distribution functions. (Might a court's
equitable deviation power or cy pres wisely be used to split the trust into
two trusts, or into a trust and a non-profit corporation?)
27
with respect to the corporation or with respect to any property held or administered by the corporation,
including without limit, property that may be subject to restrictions imposed by the donor or transferor
of such property." RMNCA, supra note 10, § 8.30(e).
24. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1010 (Limitation on Personal Liability ofTrustee) (2003).
25. See, e.g., Bylaws of the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University (June 14,
2002) (filed with the University's form 990 available at www.guidestar.com).
26. Ordcr Regarding Order to Show Cause Regarding Special Purpose Trustees' Report and Order
to Show Cause Regarding New CEO Based Management System, In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No.
2048 (Haw. Prob. Ct. May 7, 1999) (under "CEO Management Based System"), available at
http:/starbulletin.com/1999/05/07/news/removal.html.
27. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Foreword, Symposium Issue on the Bishop Estate Controversy, 21 U.
HAW. L. REV. i, ii (1999). Professor Halbach is the Reporter of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.
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II. ASCERTAINING AND ENFORCING FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A. Current Standards of Conduct: Duty of Care and Duty of Loyalty
1. Distinct Legal Forms vs. Distinct Legal Effect: Overview
Many legal scholars have advocated a single set of fiduciary standards
applicable to all charities, regardless of organizational form-although the
commentators do not always agree on what that single standard is to be.28
Initial enforcement proceedings suggested that trust fiduciary standards
would apply to corporate charities, but instead the general trend is to apply
the (business) corporate standard. 29 As Judge Gesell declared in the influ-
ential "Sibley Hospital" case:
[Tihe modem trend is to apply corporate rather than trust principles in
determining the liability of the directors of charitable corporations, be-
cause their functions are virtually indistinguishable from those of their
"pure" corporate counterparts.
... A trustee is uniformly held to a high standard of care and will be
held liable for simple negligence, while a director must often have com-
mitted "gross negligence" or otherwise be guilty of more than mere mis-
takes of judgment.
. .. Since the board members of most large charitable corporations
fall within the corporate rather than the trust model, being charged with
the operation of ongoing businesses [as opposed to merely the manage-
ment of the trust funds], it has been said that they should only be held to
the less stringent corporate standard of care.
30
28. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar. An Unfulfilled State
Responsibiliy, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1960); FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT,
supra note 13; Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497
(1981); James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform,
34 EMORY L.J. 617 (1985); FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13.
29. See ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2, supra note 9, § 315 (Duty of Care) cmt. b
(Trust versus corporate standard of care), at 38-39. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY
(Servitudes) § 6.14 (2000), which combines the corporate and trust terminology in adopting the corpo-
rate standard for the fiduciaries of homeowners associations:
The directors and officers of an association have a duty to act in good faith, to act in
compliance with the law and the governing documents, to deal fairly with the association and
its members, and to use ordinary care and prudence in performing their functions.
30. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp.
1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem.) (citations omitted) accord Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 462 (Del.
1991) (giving legal significance to the charity founder's choice of the corporate, rather than the trust,
form); Johnson v. Johnson, 515 A.2d 255, 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986) (stating that the standard
of care for investments by a director of a charitable corporation is one of ordinary business care and
prudence rather than the stricter standard of a trust fiduciary)-
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In the absence of bad faith or self-dealing, courts prefer to defer to the
business judgment of charity managers; 31 legislatures relax the investment
duties of institutional fund managers and the risk of personal liability for
trustees; 32 and the Internal Revenue Service generally applies a presump-
tion of reasonableness to the determination of independent board members
of public charities in setting compensation and other benefits. 33 Moreover,
the modem trust standard-whether because of settlor direction, 34 legisla-
tion,35 or even court decision 36-ess frequently operates more "strictly"
than the corporate standard.
It can be difficult simply to state the trust and corporate fiduciary
standards. Besides the difference between the standards in theory and the
standards as practiced, a difference in terminology can mask the essential
similarities.
It is traditional to speak of the twin fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act combines a director's
31. The business judgment rule enjoys wide judicial acceptance in the nonprofit context. In hold-
ing that the business judgment rule can be available to a board that properly constitutes a special litiga-
tion committee, the Minnesota supreme court stated:
Other states have applied the business judgment rule to decisions of nonprofit corporations,
explicitly or implicitly. The highest courts of Alabama, Hawaii, and South Dakota have done
so, as have intermediate appellate courts of Colorado, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, and Wisconsin. We find no case denying a nonprofit organization the protection of the
business judgment rule.
Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003) (footnote omitted). See generally ALl,
Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2, supra note 9, § 365 (Business Judgment Rule) & cmts. and rptr's
notes, at 152-63.
32. See UNIF. MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT (1972 and ongoing reform project); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE (1992).
33. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2004) (rebuttable presumption that a transaction is not an excess
benefit transaction).
34. Marion Fremont-Smith observes: "Modem trust documents invariably include both relief from
the strict duties of care and loyalty as well as provisions for exculpation in the event of their breach.
Accordingly it is rare that the strict liability embodied in the law of trusts described herein is enforced
by a court." FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supru note 13, at 188.
35. See, for example, the Reporter's Notes in the draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts:
The present Comment is like recent uniform acts in abandoning the traditional doctrine
that a trustee has an absolute duty not to misdeliver trust income or principal. Uniform Trust
Code § 1006 (Reliance on Trust Instrument) states: "A trustee who acts in reasonable reliance
of the terms of the trust as expressed in the trust instrument is not liable to a beneficiary for a
breach of trust to the extent the breach resulted from the reliance." . . . Cf. Uniform Prudent
Investor Act § 1(b), protecting a trustee from a liability to the extent the trustee acts in rea-
sonable reliance on the trust provisions.
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 76 (Duty to Administer the Trust
in Accordance with Its Terms and Applicable Law) rptr's notes on cmt.f, at 135-36.
36. See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty. Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 144) (on file with Chicago-Kent Law
Review) [hereinafter Langbein, Sole Interest or Best Interest?] (illustrating judicial refusal to apply the
"sole interest rule" duty of loyalty: "The courts looked at the merits of this mode of trust investing [in
mortgage participations] and preferred the trust beneficiary's best interest over his or her sole inter-
est.").
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fiduciary duties into a single provision called "standards of care."
37 If we
can break this provision apart, the corporate duty of loyalty arises from the
director's duty to act "in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation," and the duty of care arises from the
director's obligation to act "with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would exercise under similar circumstances"; overlaying both
duties is the obligation to act "in good faith."'38 A trustee owes the benefici-
aries the duty of loyalty 39 and the duty of prudence 40 (and the duty of im-
37. The "general standards for directors," set forth in section 8.30(a) of the Revised Model Non-
profit Corporation Act, contains three component requirements:
A director shall discharge his or her duties as a director, including his or her duties as a mem-
ber of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the cor-
poration.
RMNCA, supra note 10, § 8.30(a). As explained in the Official Comment to section 8.30, the drafters
intend this standard of conduct to embrace both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty imposed on a
nonprofit director. Specific aspects of the duty of loyalty are then developed in sections 8.31 (Director
Conflict of Interest), 8.32 (Loans or Guarantees for Directors and Officers), and 8.33 (Liability for
Unlawful Distributions).
Fremont-Smith reports that a 1987 survey revealed only ten states with statutory standards of
conduct for their nonprofit directors. By January 1, 2003, however, thirty-seven states had adopted a
duty of care provision in their nonprofit corporation acts, and six additional states had adopted a duty of
care provision in their business corporation act. Twenty-three of these forty-three states follow the
three-part articulation in Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act § 8.30(a) (which follows the pre-
1998 articulation in the Model Business Corporation Act). FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13, at 207.
38. Fremont-Smith examines the influence of the Model Act's three-part conception of the non-
profit director's standard of conduct. Her fifty-one-jurisdiction review (including the District of Colum-
bia) found that the "ordinarily prudent person" component appears in thirty-eight of the forty-three
statutes articulating a duty of care; that the good faith component appears in forty of the forty-three
statutes; and that the "best interests" component appears in the same or modified form in thirty-nine
statutes. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13, at 207-08; cf
Hillary A- Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004) (arguing that under modem
Delaware jurisprudence, the duty to act in good faith is an independent third duty, which may be vio-
lated even if the director discharged the duties of loyalty and care).
39. The draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts' "duty of loyalty" begins:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, a trustee has a duty to admin-
ister the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries, or solely in furtherance of its charitable
purpose.
(2) Except in discrete circumstances (Comment c), the trustee is subject to a strict pro-
hibition against engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that otherwise involve or
create a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary duties and personal interests.
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 78 (Duty of Loyalty), at 156.
Comment c describes such exceptions as transactions authorized by the terms of the trust and trustee's
compensation. Id. § 78 cmt. c, at 167, 170. See also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 (Duty of Loyalty) (2003).
40. The draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts' "duty of prudence" appears in § 77, and begins:
(1) The trustee has a duty to administer the trust as a prudent person would, in light of
the purposes, terms, and other circumstances of the trust.
(2) The duty of prudence requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution....
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partiality among the beneficiaries). 4 1 Importantly, the draft Restatement
(Third) of Trusts grounds the duty of loyalty in the trustee's "duty to ad-
minister the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries, or solely in fur-
therance of its charitable purpose." 42 Is acting in furtherance of charitable
purpose different from acting "in the best interests of the corporation"?
And is "care" different from "prudence"? Indeed, the Revised Model Non-
profit Corporation Act uses the term "prudence" in articulating the duty of
care.
43
Even if the standards for private trusts and business corporations dif-
fer, should conformity be sought for charitable trusts and corporate chari-
ties? In particular, governing an operating charity-corporate or trust-
requires more than administration, and hence more than the exercise of
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 77 (Duty of Prudence), at 137.
Note that the draft Third Restatement comments:
More is required than the exercise of reasonable care alone, for a trustee may be liable
for losses that result from failure to use the skill of an individual of ordinary intelligence, de-
spite [the] use of all the skill the particular trustee possesses. A person who serves as trustee
should be reasonably able to understand the basic duties of prudent trusteeship. The practical
need in trust law for some objective standard in these matters means that some persons are not
properly capable of serving as trustees.
Id. § 77 (Duty of Prudence) cmt. on subsecs. (I) and (2), at 139-40 (emphasis in original).
41. The drafi Restatement (Third) of Trusts comments:
The core of trust fiduciary law is found in §§ 77 through 79-the fundamental standards
of fiduciary conduct in trust administration. These three Sections deal, respectively, with the
trustee's duties of prudence (so fundamental to the investment function and further developed
in §§ 90-92), loyalty (often called the "cardinal" principle of fiduciary relationships, but par-
ticularly strict in the law of trusts), and impartiality (balancing the diverse interests and com-
peting claims-concurrently and over time-of the various beneficiaries or objectives of
typical modem trusts).
Id. at 112-13 (Introductory Note to Chapter 15, Specific Duties of Trusteeship) (emphases in original).
Note that the Third Restatement covers private and charitable trusts in the same sections, so the provi-
sions might be applied differently depending on the type of trust.
42. Id. § 78 (Duty of Loyalty), at 156.
43. The comment to § 77 of the draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides:
The duty to act with caution does not, of course, mean the avoidance of all risk but refers to a
degree of caution that is reasonably appropriate or suitable to the particular trust, its purposes
and circumstances, the beneficiaries' interests, and the trustee's plan for administering the
trust and achieving its objectives.
Id. § 77 (Duty of Prudence) cmt. on subsecs. (1) and (2) b (Elements of prudence: care, skill, and
caution), at 141. Compare this to Official Comment 2 to section 8.30 of the Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act, which states:
This familiar language [of ordinary prudence] allows directors of nonprofit corporations to
exercise their judgment with due regard to the nature, operations, finances, and objectives of
their organizations. The "ordinarily prudent person" concept is used in various contexts. In
the context of nonprofit corporations it applies to directors who balance potential risks and
rewards in exercising their duties as directors. It is intended to protect directors who innovate
and take informed risks to carry out the corporate goals and objectives. The directors need not
be right, but they must act with common sense and informed judgment, The duty of care rec-
ognizes that directors are not guarantors of the success of investments, activities, programs or
grants. It allows leeway and discretion in exercising judgment.
RMNCA, supra note 10, § 8.30 off. cmt. 2 (Duty of Care).
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prudent stewardship over the investment and distribution of assets. The
draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts begins the section on "Powers and Du-
ties of Trustees" with: "In administering a trust, a trustee .... ,,44 Similarly,
the Uniform Trust Code labels the trustee's duty of prudence as the duty of
"prudent administration." 45 Governing boards may-and perhaps should be
encouraged to-take reasonable and appropriate risks rather than simply
endeavor to preserve the value of assets. 46 Indeed, the 1998 revision of the
standard of conduct for directors in the Model Business Corporation Act
deleted the term "prudent" from the formulation of the duty of care for this
very reason. 47 The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act was based on
the prior version of the Model Business Corporation Act. One state has
incorporated the 1998 business-law formulation of the director's standards
of conduct into its nonprofit corporation act.
4 8
2. Reducing Fiduciary Liability-Subject to Minimum Standards
Both trust and corporate law are enabling regimes, setting forth default
rules in the absence of direction to the contrary in the trust instrument or
articles of incorporation and bylaws. Well-drafted documents creating
charities typically minimize the fiduciaries' risk of liability for breach.
However, considerations of public policy set a lower bound on a charity
44. Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 70 (Powers and Duties of
Trustees), at 7. In addition, the draft Third Restatement comments:
The most important of the discretionary powers in most trusts are those having to do with
various aspects of the investment function, together with, in many trusts, those having to do
with discretionary distributions, such as a power to invade principal for an income beneficiary
or the power to distribute income to a beneficiary or among a class of beneficiaries.
Id. § 87 (Judicial Control of Discretionary Powers) cmt. a (Scope of Section; cross-references), at 40 1.
45- UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804 (Prudent Administration) (2003).
46. See also John H_ Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105,
1115 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory Rules] ("Trust law discourages investments that require
trustees to engage in active entrepreneurship.").
47. Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2) (General Standards for Directors) (1998), with
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (Standards of Conduct for Directors) (2002). As explained in the
Official Comment:
In earlier versions of the Model Act the duty of care element was included in subsection
(a), with the text reading: "[a] director shall discharge his duties.., with the care an ordinar-
ily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances." The use of
the phrase "ordinarily prudent person" in a basic guideline for director conduct, suggesting
caution or circumspection vis-h-vis danger or risk, has long been problematic given the fact
that risk-taking decisions are central to the directors' role. When coupled with the exercise of
"care," the prior text had a familiar resonance long associated with the field of tort law- See
the Official Comment to section 8.31. The further coupling with the phrasal verb "shall dis-
charge" added to the inference that former section 8.30(a)'s standard of conduct involved a
negligence standard, with resultant confusion. In order to facilitate its understanding and
analysis, independent of the other general standards of conduct for directors, the duty of care
element has been set forth as a separate standard of conduct in subsection (b).
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (Standards of Conduct for Directors) cmt. (2002).
48. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31 E-8-830 (Standards of conduct for directors) (West 2002).
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organizer's power to waive fiduciary liability and to relax duties of loyalty
and care.49 Under either trust doctrine or corporate law, a charity founder
cannot entirely waive fiduciary duties or the consequences of breach.50 As
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared in 1867: "No testator
can obtain for his bequests that support and permanence which the law
gives to public charities only, and at the same time deprive the beneficiaries
and the public of the safeguards which the law provides for their due and
lawful administration." 51
The default rules under corporate law are more relaxed than under
trust law. As to the duty of loyalty, a fiduciary may enter into an "interested
transaction" with the corporation if certain procedural conditions are satis-
fied: A properly approved conflict-of-interest transaction requires the inter-
ested fiduciary to disclose the material facts, and abstain from the decision;
and disinterested board members to exercise their business judgment, in
good faith, and on the reasonable belief that the transaction is not just fair,
but also in the best interests of the charity. 5
2
49. See generally ALI, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2, supra note 9, § 320 (Waivers and
Exculpations in the Organic Documents), at 47.
50. The draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts comments: "A trustee's duties, like trustee powers,
may be modified by the terms of the trust, but the fiduciary duties of trusteeship are subject to certain
minimum standards that are fundamental, and normally essential to the trust relationship .. " Restate-
ment (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 87 (Fiduciary Duties and the Exercise of
Trustee Powers) cmt. b (All powers are subject to trustee's fiduciary duties), at 377. Thus, in the
settlor's grant to the trustee of discretion, "words such as 'absolute' or 'sole and uncontrolled' or
'unlimited' are not interpreted literally." Id. § 87 (Judicial Control of Discretionary Powers) cmt. d
(Extended discretion: limitations, interpretation, and effects), at 408. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS, § 29 cmt. in, at 66-67 (2003):
Thus, a provision that purports to prevent a court from removing a trustee will be disregarded
if removal appears appropriate to proper administration of the trust; and an arbitrary restric-
tion on the appointment of trustees or successor trustees may be invalid if not reasonably re-
lated to the trust purposes. A provision is also invalid to the extent it purports to relieve the
trustee altogether from accountability .... or to relieve the trustee from liability even for dis-
honest or reckless acts....
See generally FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 13, at 433-34;
FREEMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13, at 188. Public policy
would not allow a trustee to be relieved of responsibility for willful and deliberate breaches, gross
negligence, or fraud. See Report of [A.B.A.] Committee on Charitable Trusts, Duties of Charitable
Trust Trustees and Charitable Corporation Directors, 2 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 545, 555 (1967).
As Carl Zollmann observed, "A provision in a will that the trustee shall not be held accountable for the
non-performance or ill-performance of the trust is... ineffective, and will have to give way to the
statute which says that he shall account." CARL ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
424 (1924) (footnotes omitted).
51. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 571 (1867).
52. The law has long recognized that it is inappropriate to ban all interested transactions between
fiduciaries and the modem nonprofit organization. Such, however, was the traditional trust approach,
under which, essentially, the state prohibited any conduct between a charity and its fiduciaries that is
hard for an outsider to monitor and judge for fairness. No solution this simple, however, comes without
cost. Per se prohibitions sweep too broadly, and void too many transactions that would benefit the
charity and thus benefit the public. As of January 1, 2003, forty-eight states have adopted conflict-of-
interest provisions for nonprofit corporate directors (thirty-six in nonprofit corporation statutes, and
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Moreover, Professor John Langbein argues that the trust law duty of
loyalty should be moved closer to the corporate articulation. He finds that
imposing a duty to administer the trust "solely in the interests of the benefi-
ciaries" deprives the trust of transactions that might best serve the trust in
situations where the trustee also benefits. 53 Professor Langbein's "reform
urged here is to allow a conflicted trustee to defend on the ground that the
particular transaction was prudently undertaken in the best interest of the
beneficiaries. '54 He observes that his approach would apply only to poorly
drafted instruments, given the settlor's power to authorize such transac-
tions; moreover, a trustee can already apply for advance judicial approval
of a conflicted transaction (in which case the court will apply the best-
interests test).55
As to the duty of care, nonprofit directors who are informed, exercise
independent judgment, and act in good faith are protected from personal
liability under a court-created standard of review called the "business
judgment rule." As a result, a director can be found liable for breaching the
duty of care only by committing gross negligence (basically, acting reck-
lessly or not in good faith). At the same time, many state nonprofit corpora-
tion statutes permit the articles of incorporation to contain a personal
monetary "liability shield" for directors who, in good faith, breach the duty
of care (but not the duty of loyalty). 56
another twelve available by reference to business corporation statutes). FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13, at 218. Under a variety of processes in these statutes for
validating self-dealing transactions with a corporate charity, "the transaction is not voidable by the
corporation. In addition, eighteen states and the [Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act] provide
that upon validation the director may not be held liable to the corporation for damages resulting from
the conflict of interest transaction." Id. at 219 (footnote omitted). In general, such a transaction will be
reviewed for substantive faimess only in the absence of a process requiring decision making by disin-
terested fiduciaries. Even so, under the federal tax laws, all private foundations are still subject to the
strict prohibition on self-dealing, with an exception only for reasonable compensation. See generally
ALI, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2, supra note 9, § 330 (Interested Transactions and Compensa-
tion) & cmts. and rptr's notes, at 68-91.
53. See Langbein, Sole Interest or Best Interest?, supra note 36 (manuscript at 104).
54. Id. (manuscript at 161).
55. Id. (manuscript at 105).
56. See generally ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2, supra note 9, § 370 (Limitations on
Monetary Liability for Breach) & cmts. and rptr's notes, at 164-80. See also RMNCA, supra note 10,
Alternative § 2.02(b)(5) (Optional Article Provision); id., § 8.30(d) (General Standards for Directors).
Alternative section 2.02(b)(5) permits the articles of incorporation to include:
(5) provisions eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corpora-
tion or members of the corporation for monetary damages for breach of any such director's
duties to the corporation and its members, provided that such a provision may not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director:
(i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its mem-
bers;
(ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct
or a knowing violation of law;
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Some default rules in recent trust-law reforms have moved away from
absolute liability. Regardless of legislated relief, the settlor of a charitable
trust typically includes provisions in the instrument that relieve the trus-
tee(s) of legal duties to the maximum extent permitted; this generally re-
sults in a lenient standard like that imposed on corporate directors.
5 7
As to the duty of loyalty, a trust settlor may want to relax the tradi-
tional proscriptions on dealings between the trustee and the trust, so that
transactions make take place if fair to the trust and in its best interests (the
corporate standard). However, as articulated in section 105(b)(3) of the
(iii) for any transaction from which a director derived an improper personal eco-
nomic benefit ....
Id. Alternative § 2.02(b)(5). Correspondingly, alternative section 8.30(d) adds a second sentence to the
standard section 8.30(d) (discussed under § 330 (Standards of Conduct for Governing Board and Its
Members: Duty of Loyalty and Duty of Care)). Alternative section 8.30(d) thus reads:
(d) A director is not liable to the corporation, any member, or any other person for any
action taken or not taken as a director, if the director acted in compliance with this section.
The liability of a director for monetary damages to the corporation and its members may be
eliminated or limited in the corporation's articles to the extent provided in section 2.02(b)(5).
Id. Alternative § 8.30(d). Twenty-one states have made available to their nonprofit corporations the
option to adopt a liability shield (three in their business corporation statutes, which cover nonprofit
corporations). See FREMONT-SMtI, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13, app., tbl.
3 (Fiduciary Duties Under State Laws), at 514-17.
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act is based on the 1984 Revised Model Business
Corporation Act. On the theory that the risk of large judgments dissuades good directors from service
and encourages them to be overly cautious in making decisions, legislatures across the country moved
to permit business corporations to indemnify directors and-usually only upon shareholder approval-
to adopt a shield against monetary damages for directors who act in good faith and not out of self-
interest. A monetary shield does not alter the standard of care, but rather limits the corporation to
nonmonetary remedies such as injunction or removal of the offending director. Limiting the potential
cost for duty-of-care breaches to the compensation received might make courts more inclined to uphold
standards of care, and can be reconciled with a restitutionary measure of damages. Nonmonetary reme-
dies, such as removal, remain.
The legal question remains whether shareholders of corporations in those states without ena-
bling statutes might nevertheless adopt such charter amendments. The Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance suggest that, in the absence of a statute, the ability to limit a director's monetary exposure for
breaches of the duty of care to the corporation is a matter of shareholder right. In any case, the contrac-
tarian view of charter liability shields is hard to apply to the "principal-less" model of a memberless
nonprofit corporation (unless prospective donors are viewed as basing their decision to contribute on
the existence of such an amendment to the articles). Indeed, the absence of shareholders suggests that it
should be unnecessary to require nonprofit corporations without members to adopt such a charter
amendment. Nevertheless, alternate paragraph (d) to section 8.30 of the Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act tracks Delaware's opt-in approach, and so whether the shield applies depends, first, on
the state's adopting enabling legislation, and, second, on each charity's articles of incorporation. Com-
pare RMNCA, supra note 10, § 8.30(d), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8., § 102 (Michie 2001).
57. The draft Restatement Third of Trusts contains the following comment, which appears to be
focused on a private trust:
A trustee cannot properly hire his or her own family members.., in the administration of the
trust, except as the family member may be a beneficiary of the trust and the employment is
consistent with the trust's purposes and beneficial interests, and also with the trustee's duty of
impartiality (§ 79).
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 78 (Duty of Loyalty) cmt. e(l)
(Undivided loyalty: employing trustee'sfamily members), at 186-87. It is not clear whether the general
policy to defer to the terms of the trust would differ on this issue in the context of a charitable trust.
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Uniform Trust Code, the terms of the trust cannot override "the require-
ment that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of its beneficiaries ."58
Similarly, the draft Third Restatement comments:
Even express authorization... would not completely dispense with
the trustee's underlying fiduciary obligations to act in the interest of the
beneficiaries and to exercise prudence in the administering the trust. Ac-
cordingly, no matter how broad the provisions of a trust may be in con-
ferring power to engage in self-dealing or other transactions involving a
conflict of fiduciary and personal interests, a trustee violates the duty of
loyalty to the beneficiaries by acting in bad faith or unfairly.
59
As to the duty of prudence, the draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts
comments: "A primary question is whether and to what extent the settlor's
language may authorize the trustee to act beyond the bounds of what would
otherwise be a reasonable judgment. 60 The Reporter observes:
Although the commentary here ... does not foreclose the possibility
of an interpretation that dispenses with the requirement of "reasonable-
ness," it does not follow Trusts Second in its recognition of that result as
the ordinary construction of typical language of extended discretion...,
because that construction neither seems routinely appropriate nor does
case authority actually support that generalization. It is difficult to find
cases in which the court has upheld an exercise of discretion that, in the
circumstances, truly appears to have been unreasonable.
6 1
Importantly, the Reporter's Notes quote a leading treatise that
concluded:
58. See also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(10) (2003) (providing that the instrument cannot over-
ride "the effect of an exculpatory term under Section 1008"). Section 1008 provides, in part:
(a) A term of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for breach of trust is unenforceable to
the extent that it: (I) relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith
or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of its beneficiar-
ies....
Id. § 1008. Professor John Langbein cites to Uniform Trust Code § 105(b)(3) in observing: "A default
rule is one that the settlor can abridge, but only to the extent that the settlor's term is 'for the benefit of
[the] beneficiaries."' Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 46, at 1112 (footnote omitted). He con-
cludes: "although the various fiduciary rules are default rules, the settlor may not abrogate them in their
entirety, because eliminating all fiduciary duties would make the trust illusory [by effecting an absolute
transfer to the trustee]." Id. at 1122-23.
59. Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 78 (Duty of Loyalty)
cmt. c(2) (Authorization in terms of trust), at 167-68.
60. Id. § 87 (Judicial Control of Discretionary Powers) cmt. d (Extended discretion: limitations,
interpretation, and effects), at 409. The comment continues:
Examination of the overall tenor of language granting powers and other terms of trusts
may lead to diverse, refined interpretations on a case-by-case basis. For example, a court may
conclude that the language of extended discretion and other evidence before it manifests a
settlor intention to authorize the particular trustee to act with a lesser degree of caution (e.g.
to accept a greater degree [ofl compensated risk), but not a lesser degree of care, than would
otherwise be appropriate to the particular trust and its circumstances under the duty of pru-
dence (§ 77).
Id. (emphasis in original).
61. Id. at rptr's notes on § 87 cmt. d, at 419 (emphasis in original).
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In many cases it would appear that the same result is reached regardless
of which standard [i.e., extended or simple discretion] is applied by the
court .... There is agreement that a trustee must act in good faith and
without an improper motive, and that a trustee must not act arbitrarily or
capriciously, that is, without any exercise of his judgment .... 
62
3. Conclusion as to Organizational Form
The "strict" fiduciary duties for charitable trusts can be modified by
the settlors to match those for corporate, charities. Importantly, both trust
and corporate law impose minimum-i.e., nonwaivable-duties of loyalty
and care, exercised in good faith. Nothing unique to either the trust or the
corporate form impedes conforming the standards of fiduciary duty for all
forms of charity.63 It is fair to ask, though, whether the minimum fiduciary
duties for charities (trust or corporate) should be stricter than those for pri-
vate trusts and business corporations.
B. Effect of Structural Protections
Structural differences between trusts and corporations, or between
types of trusts and types of corporations, loom larger than substantive dif-
ferences in fiduciary duties.
62. Id. (quoting GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 560 (Supp. 2003)).
63. Subsection (3) of § 77 of the draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides: "(3) If the trustee
possesses, or procured appointment by purporting to possess, special facilities or greater skill than that
of a person of ordinary prudence, the trustee has a duty to use such facilities or skill." Id. § 77, at 137.
Similarly, the Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 2(f) requires a trustee to use the trustee's own skills and
expertise in carrying out the trustee's fiduciary duties. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(f) (1995). See
also Unif. Mgmt. of Inst. Funds Act § 3(k) (draft Mar. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/umoifa/2005MarDraft.htm. A comment to section 8.30 of the Re-
vised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act describes the existence of a similar rule under the law of non-
profit corporations:
The concept of "under similar circumstances" relates not only to the circumstances of the
corporation but to the special background, qualifications, and management experience of the
individual director and the role the director plays in the corporation. In many public benefit
corporations an important role of directors is fund-raising. Many directors are elected to the
board to raise money or because of financial contributions they have made to the corporation.
These individuals may have no particular skill or background that otherwise would be helpful
to the corporation. No special skill or expertise should be expected from such directors unless
their background or knowledge evidences some special ability. Such individuals upon becom-
ing directors are obligated to act as directors and may not simply act as figureheads ignoring
problems. However, their role should be considered in determining whether they have met
their obligations under section 8.30.
RMNCA, supra note 10, § 8.30 off. cmt. 2 (Duty of Care).
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1. Governing Board Composition, Size, and Decision Making
For a charitable trust, the settlor determines the number (which may
be as low as one), qualification, and other rules regarding selection of trus-
tees.64 The trustees of a charitable trust may be individuals or institutions.
Other differences between the trust and corporate legal regime can be
eliminated in the organic documents. For example, as a general rule a cor-
porate director may resign, but, under the common law, a trustee may do so
only with court approval (unless the trust instrument provides otherwise).
6 5
For a nonprofit corporation, most states-and section 8.03 of the Re-
vised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act-require a minimum of three di-
rectors, but some states allow as few as one; no state imposes a maximum
number.66 A charity is free to incorporate in a jurisdiction that permits the
desired minimum board size.67 In contrast to trustees, the directors of the
board of a nonprofit corporation must be individuals, not entities. 68 Rea-
64. See, for example, Moody v. Haas, 493 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), in which the court
refused to authorize the expansion of the board of a $120-million family foundation from three to
seven:
If... a court could disregard the settlor's plan for administration of a public charity simply
because the judge believed that another plan would be better, such rule would substantially
discourage the establishment of charitable trusts, or, at least, encourage the settlors to seek
other jurisdictions in which to establish them. The adoption of such rule also would upset the
stability of many of the charitable foundations that now exist in Texas[, many of which ]...
including the largest ones, have fewer than seven trustees.
Id. at 567. The appeals court seemed particularly disturbed by expert testimony calling for representa-
tion on the board that reflect geographic, professional, and minority-group diversity, observing of these
to-be-majority trustees: "The selection of the individuals who are to administer the trust may substan-
tially influence not only the manner in which the trust is administered but also the areas of the charita-
ble purpose that will be emphasized." [d. at 562, 564.
65. See, e.g., Bylaws of the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, supra
note 25, § 1.08 (Resignation) ("Any Trustee may in writing delivered to an officer of the Board resign
as Trustee, such resignation to be effective when accepted by the Board at a meeting or at any time by
the Chair."). In contrast to § 36 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, the Uniform Trust Code permits a
trustee to resign, commenting: "This section rejects the common law rule that a trustee may resign only
with permission of the court, and goes further than the Restatements, which allow a trustee to resign
with the consent of the beneficiaries." UNIF. TRUST CODE § 705 cmt. (2003) (citation omitted).
66. See the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance:
small publicly held corporations and large publicly held corporations that are majority-owned
by a single person, a family group, or a control group ... should have at least three directors
who are free of significant relationships with the corporation's senior executives. The number
three is chosen ... in the belief that it is the number of directors necessary to attain a critical
mass on the board.
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3A.01 (Composition of the Board in Publicly Held Corporations) cmt. c (Rationale) (1992) [hereinaf-
ter ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
67. But see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN., STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT 13 (2004), available at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf [hereinafter SFC STAFF
DISCUSSION DRAFT] (requiring as a condition of federal tax exemption a governing board of between
three and fifteen members).
68. Cf 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5732 (West 1995) (As for corporate officers, president and
secretary must be individuals, but treasurer may be a corporation.).
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sonable criteria for board membership may be included in the organic
documents. 69 A nonprofit corporation may condition board membership on
such ideological characteristics as membership in the organization or ad-
herence to a certain philosophy, and on such performance characteristics as
experience in a particular industry, satisfactory performance as a board
member, and attendance at a certain number or percentage of meetings.
70
Despite the variety of skills and perspectives that constitute an effec-
tive board, importantly, in the corporate context, the board as a whole,
rather than any separate director, has the authority to govern the corpora-
tion, and the group takes action by (usually) majority decision of those
constituting a quorum.7 1 Most of the work of a governing board of any
significant size occurs in committees. 72 The committees report back their
activities and recommendations to the governing board, and the governing
board retains ultimate responsibility for oversight. As described in com-
ments to the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act: "directors may not
abdicate their responsibilities and secure exoneration from liability simply
by delegating authority to board committees." 73 Expressed another way, the
articles or bylaws of a nonprofit corporation cannot specify that some board
members have only limited duties (although they may have different tasks).
See the following example provided by the official comments to the ALI
Principles of Corporate Governance:
C, who is rich and charming, has been a director of Y Corporation
for several years. C's only significant contribution to Y has been a will-
ingness to entertain important customers. C has said: "I do not have the
69. See RMNCA, supra note 10, § 8.02 off. cmt.
70. See ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 66, § 3A.04 (Nominating
Committee in Publicly Held Corporations: Composition, Powers, and Functions). The Comment to
section 3A.04 reads:
Policies on board composition might include such elements as the desired mix of senior ex-
ecutives, persons with a signifiqant relationship to the senior executives, and persons without
such a relationship. Criteria for board membership might include such elements as occupa-
tional background and field of skill. Criteria for continuation on the board might include such
elements as age and attendance to board duties.
Id. at cmt. e (Other Functions), Similarly, the Business Roundtable comments:
Because the corporation's need for particular backgrounds and experiences may change over
time, the board should monitor the mix of skills and experience that directors bring to the
board to assess, at each stage in the life of the corporation, whether the board has the neces-
sary tools to perform its oversight function effectively.
THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE I I (May 2002).
71. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance?, 55 VAND. L. REV. I (2002) (derived from STEPHEN M_ BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW
AND ECONOMICS 191-240 (chapter 5) (2002)).
72. See generally ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2, supra note 9, § 325 (Board Responsi-
bility and Delegation), at 53-67; id. § 3A.5 (Committees of the Board), at 251-62.
73. RMNCA, supra note 10, § 8.25 off. cmt. (quoting MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25 Official
Comment).
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capacity to oversee Y's business," and has made no attempt to oversee it.
Y Corporation has gone into bankruptcy because of mismanagement. C,
as a result of the failure to oversee the conduct of Y's business, has
committed a breach of the duty of care. The fact that C may not have the
capacity of an "ordinarily prudent person" is no defense. C will be held
to an objective standard.
7 4
As in the case of a corporate board, a trust settlor might appoint multi-
ple trustees to best serve the purposes of the trust: "Cotrustees are often
appointed to gain advantage of differing skills, perhaps a financial institu-
tion for its permanence and professional skills, and a family member to
maintain a personal connection with the beneficiaries." 75 Trust law has
long recognized the desirability of permitting charitable trustees to act by
majority decision even when the default rule required co-trustees of a pri-
vate trust to act unanimously. 76 Section 39 of the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts now provides, as to both charitable and private trusts:
Unless otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, if there are two
trustees their powers may be exercised only by concurrence of both of
them, absent an emergency or a proper delegation; but if there are three
or more trustees their powers may be exercised by a majority.
77
The recently promulgated Uniform Trust Code cautions, however:
Cotrusteeship should not be called for without careful reflection.
Division of responsibility among cotrustees is often confused, the ac-
countability of any individual trustee is uncertain, obtaining consent of
all trustees can be burdensome, and unless an odd number of trustees is
named deadlocks requiring court resolution can occur. Potential prob-
lems can be reduced by addressing division of responsibilities in the
terms of the trust .... 78
In contrast to the corporate rule that the board acts as a group, the
settlor's authority to determine the rules of the trust extends to a power to
74. ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 66, § 4.01 (Duty of Care of Direc-
tors and Officers; the Business Judgment Rule) cmt. to § 4.0 1(a), first paragraph, illus. 6.
75. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703 cmt. (2003).
76 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 383 (Several Trustees) (1957) ("If there are several
trustees of a charitable trust, the powers conferred upon them can properly be exercised by a majority of
the trustees, unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust."). See generally FREMONT-SMITH,
FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 13, at 107 ("In a private trust powers can be exercised
only with the concurrence of all the trustees; whereas in a charitable trust, the affirmation of a majority
is sufficient unless there is a provision.. . requiring unanimity.")- For an articulation of the policy and
effect of majority decision making by trustees, see Madden v- University Club ofEvanston:
The practicality and fairness of this section is evident: it facilitates trust management because
it (1) allows cotrustees to act without unanimous agreement and (2) frees dissenting minority
trustees from liability which may result from the acts of the majority. The dissenter is not,
however, empowered to bring an action involving the trust property contrary to the wishes of
the majority.
422 N.E.2d 1172, 1174 (111. App. Ct. 1981).
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 39 (Exercise of Powers by Multiple Trustees) (2003).
78. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703 cmt. (2003).
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allocate different responsibilities to different trustees, and a trustee is not
liable for the performance of responsibilities assigned to another. The gen-
eral rule is set forth in subsection (1) of § 81 of the draft Third Restate-
ment: "If a trust has more than one trustee, except as otherwise provided by
the terms of the trust, each trustee has a duty and the right to participate in
the administration of the trust."'79 A comment in the draft Third Restate-
ment explains:
The duties of multiple trustees, as discussed in this Section, may be re-
duced, modified,'or specially allocated by the terms of the trust.
Thus, trust provisions may allocate roles and responsibilities among
the trustees, or relieve one or more of the trustees of duties to participate
in particular aspects of the trust's administration.... The settlor's limit-
ing of a trustee's functions or allocation of functions among the trustees
usually, either explicitly or as a matter of interpretation, has the effect of
relieving the trustee(s) to whom a function is not allocated of any af-
firmative duty to remain informed or to participate in deliberations about
matters within that function.80
In the absence of such an allocation in the trust instrument, "each co-
trustee has a duty, and also the right, of active, prudent participation in the
performance of all aspects of the trust's administration." 1 The draft Third
Restatement adds:
The trustee's duty to participate in administering the trust does not
require an equal level of effort or activity by each co-trustee, as recog-
nized in the variability of their "reasonable" compensation (§ 38, Com-
ment i). Accordingly, the duty of participation by each of the co-trustees
does not prevent them from deciding (short of constituting delegation) to
allow one or more of the co-trustees to carry more of the burden in re-
gard to various matters, for example, by initiating, analyzing, reporting,
and making recommendations for reasonably informed action by all of
the trustees. It does, however, prevent the trustees from "dividing" the
trusteeship or its functions in a manner that is not authorized by the
terms of the trust.
82
79. Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 81(1) (Duty With Re-
spect to Co-Trustees), at 287. Compare UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703 (2003).
80. Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 81 (Duty With Respect to
Co-Trustees) gen. cmt. b (Effect of the terms of the trust), at 289-90. The comment continues: "Even in
matters for which a trustee is relieved of responsibility, however, if the trustee knows that a co-trustee is
committing or attempting to commit a breach of trust, the trustee has a duty to take reasonable steps to
prevent the fiduciary misconduct." Id. at 290. The comment adds: "Furthermore, absent clear provision
in the trust to the contrary, even in the absence of any duty to intervene or grounds for suspicion, a
trustee is entitled to request and receive reasonable information regarding an aspect of trust administra-
tion in which the trustee is not required to participate." Id. See discussion of enforcement, below.
8t. Id. § 8t (Duty With Respect to Co-Trustees) cmt. on subsec. (1) c (Active personal participa-
tion: general rule), at 291.
82. Id. at 292. In previously analyzing on the Bishop Estate controversy (see above), the Reporter
for the Restatement (Third) of Trusts had commented:
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Alternatively, the draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains: "[i]n
appropriate situations, a panel of co-trustees ... may, in administering the
trust, function in the manner of corporate boards of directors. ' 83 Many of
the problems identified in the Uniform Trust Code's cautionary comment
would be obviated by adopting a governing-board view of co-trustees. In
the absence of settler direction, however, operational issues would remain;
for example, could the board act by majority of the quorum, rather than by
absolute majority?
8 4
Contrariwise, it is possible for the founder of a corporate charity to in-
clude a requirement in the articles of incorporation requiring the assent of
the founder or another to certain corporate decisions. Section 8.01(c) of the
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act provides:
(c) The articles may authorize a person or persons to exercise some
or all of the powers which would otherwise be exercised by a board. To
the extent so authorized any such person or persons shall have the duties
Hiring and relying upon employees and other agents, whom trustees can readily direct,
supervise and terminate, however, is far different from what might be loosely called "delega-
tion" among co-trustees. The latter invites inevitable risks of improperly "dividing up" the
trusteeship and its responsibilities. It would also give rise to the practical difficulties and reali-
ties of instructing and monitoring peers in the co-trusteeship--not to mention the inability to
fire them-with the attendant risks (to put it gently) of a "reciprocal-leniency" mentality....
Halbach, supra note 27, at vii. See also id. at vii n.18 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: THE
PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE §§ 227(c)(2) & 227 cmt. h (1992)).
The draft Third Restatement also observes that this duty to participate "does not prevent dele-
gation on a prudent basis between or among [co-trustees] with respect to essentially ministerial matters,
such as the custody of trust property and the implementation of decisions that have been made by
proper vote of the co-trustees." Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 81
(Duty with Respect to Co-Trustees) cmi. on subsec. (1) c(1) (Delegation to other co-trustee(s)), at 293.
Separately, this comment recognizes delegation by a trustee in anticipation of unavailability for illness
or absence, and where "it would be unreasonable to expect the co-trustee personally to perform the
function(s) in question" or as "may be expressly or impliedly authorized.., by the terms of the trust."
Id. at 293-95.
83. Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 81 (Duty With Respect to
Co-Trustees) cmt. on subsec. (1) c(2) (Special situations), at 295. The draft Restatement comment
continues:
Of relevance for purpose of this possibility are not only (though critical) the number of trus-
tees but also their circumstances (skills and experience, compensation, other commitments,
etc.) and the nature and scale of the trust's asset holdings, investment programs, and other ac-
tivities. Also, compare § 80 (delegation to agents) that trustees sometimes will need to and
may rely on suitable officers and staff; and compare more generally, on charities established
in trust form, ALl Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations (Council Draft No. 1,
2003) § 200 (on choice and consequences of organizational form) and ch. 3 (on "govem-
ance") ....
Id. at 295-96.
84. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Borough of Madison, 213 A.2d 33, 41 (N.J. Super., Ch. Div., 1965)
("While the number of trustees who may constitute a quorum is in the first instance a matter within the
discretion of the trustees, the number may not be less than a majority of all of the trustees in office and,
whatever the number required for a quorum may be, action may not be taken without the concurrence of
a majority of all of the trustees in office.").
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and responsibilities of the directors, and the directors shall be relieved to
that extent from such duties and responsibilities.
85
A common problem for charities with large boards-such as are found in
higher education and in arts and cultural institutions-is identifying who
sits on the "real board." The draft Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Or-
ganizations discusses the desirability of a model, for both trust and corpo-
rate charities, that empowers less than the full board to act as the governing
body-at least to the extent of clarifying a strong role for the executive
committee. The draft further asks whether courts should afford greater
deference to executive committees of nonprofit organizations than to those
of business corporations (and, in states where the Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act has not been adopted, whether legislatures should allow
charter overrides permitting a structure like that available to trust settlors to
limit the responsibility of nonexecutive committee members). 86
As a separate matter, for charitable trusts, the traditional approach had
been to prohibit delegation of action, 87 but recent reform projects support-
if not require-the use of prudent delegation. 88 Corporations cannot act
85. RMNCA, supra note 10, § 8.01(c).
86. ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2, supra note 9, § 325 (Board Responsibility and
Delegation) cmts. on subsec. (a) I (Role of the governing board), at 55.
87. The Reporter's Notes on § 80 (Duty With Respect to Delegation) of Council Draft No. 4 of the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts begin:
The contents of this Section differ significantly from the rules stated in Restatement Sec-
ond, Trusts § 171.... The earlier Trusts Restatements have allowed delegation only for min-
isterial acts, or other acts to the extent the trustee has no reasonable alternative ... ;and they
had specifically forbidden delegation of the "power to select investments" ....
The position of the American Law Institute was fundamentally changed in 1992 in Re-
statement Third, Trusts (Prudent Investor Rule) ....
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 80 (Duty With Respect to Delega-
tion) rptr's notes, at 280.
88. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807 (2003). For charitable trusts, the draft § 80 of the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts provides:
(1) A trustee has a duty to perform the responsibilities of the trusteeship personally, ex-
cept as a prudent person of comparable skill might delegate those responsibilities to others.
(2) In deciding whether, to whom, and in what manner to delegate fiduciary authority in
the administration of a trust, and thereafter in supervising or monitoring agents, the trustee
has a duty to exercise fiduciary discretion and to act as a prudent person of comparable skill
would act in similar circumstances.
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 80 (Duty With Respect to Delega-
tion), at 263. A comment provides: "Decisions of trustees concerning delegation are matters of fiduci-
ary judgment and discretion. Therefore, these decisions are not to be controlled by a court except to
prevent abuse of that discretionary authority. On control of discretionary powers generally, see § 87."
Id. § 80 (Duty With Respect to Delegation) cmt. on subsec. (1) d (General fiduciary duty and discre-
tion), at 268. Certain responsibilities are evidently too core to delegate:
With professional advice as needed, the trustee personally must at least define the trust's
investment objectives. In addition, the trustee must personally either formulate or approve the
trust's investment strategies and programs. Admittedly, even these limited generalizations are
necessarily and desirably couched in terms that are less than self-defining.
Id. at cmt, on subsec. (1)f(l) (Powers with respect to the investment function), at 273-74.
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without a certain amount of delegation, although the board may not abdi-
cate its responsibilities. 89 In the case of either a trust or a corporation, the
law requires the fiduciary to monitor compliance with delegated tasks.90
Articulating nonprofit board duties, the Missouri Attorney General recently
wrote:
[P]roper control and oversight is not a function of Board members indi-
vidually and informally. Instead, it is a function of the Board as whole
and is evidenced by the formal actions it takes: first, in establishing the
policies and procedures that will govern the Foundation's ordinary ac-
tivities; and, second, in the formal review and approval of the actions of
management in carrying out the Board's vision. When this approach is
followed, it not only ensures that proper control and oversight are in fact
89. Under corporate law, the board may determine the degree of delegation. The Official Com-
ment to the 2002 amendments to the standard of care set forth in the Model Business Corporation Act
explains:
[B]y employing the concept of delegation, section 8.30(c) does not limit the ability of direc-
tors to establish baseline principles as to management responsibilities. Specifically, section
8.01(b) provides that "all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of"
the board, and a basic board function involves the allocation of management responsibilities
and the related assignment (or delegation) of corporate powers.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (Standards of Conduct for Directors) off. cmt. (2002). However, courts
typically draw the line at the abdication of responsibilities (including monitoring), as well as the delega-
tion of core activities. In the Sibley Hospital case, Judge Gesell declared:
Total abdication of the supervisory role, however, is improper even under traditional
corporate principles. A director who fails to acquire the information necessary to supervise
investment policy or consistently fails even to attend the meetings at which such policies are
considered has violated his fiduciary duty to the corporation. While a director is, of course,
permitted to rely upon the expertise of those to whom he has delegated investment responsi-
bility, such reliance is a tool for interpreting the delegate's reports, not an excuse for dispens-
ing with or ignoring such reports. A director whose failure to supervise permits negligent
mismanagement by others to go unchecked has committed an independent wrong against the
corporation; he is not merely an accessory under an attenuated theory of respondeat superior
or constructive notice.
Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003,
1014 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem.) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Int'l Marathons,
Inc., 467 N.E.2d 58, 65 (Mass. 1984) (ruling that "[a]n officer of a nonprofit corporation cannot have
apparent authority to encumber the principal function of the corporation and to divert the substantial
earning capacity of the corporation to private benefit").
For a charity trustee that is itself a corporation, the draft Restatement (Third) explains:
Although a corporate trustee has the same responsibilities as an individual trustee with
respect to performing or delegating administrative functions of a trust, a corporation acts-
and thus may administer trusts without "delegation"-through its directors, officers, and ap-
propriate employees. This does not preclude prudent delegation to others, as agents..."
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 80 (Duty With Respect to Delega-
tion) cmt. on subsec. (1) d (Generalfiduciary duty and discretion), at 268.
90. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, at cmt. (d)(2) (Pr-
dence in delegation), at 269 ("The trustee then has a further duty to act with prudence in supervising or
monitoring the agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation."); UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 807 (2003); UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(d) (1995); Unif Mgmt. Inst. Funds Act § 5
(draft Mar. 2, 2005). A fiduciary may reasonably rely on others for information obtained through a
proper delegation of responsibilities. For example, subsections (b) and (c) of section 8.30 of the Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act generally permit a director to rely on others in gathering information.
RMNCA, supra note 10, § 8.30.
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practiced by the Board, it also provides a ready record demonstrating
where, when and how the Board fulfilled this essential duty. 91
In sum, regardless of the organizational form chosen, a charity foun-
der can achieve as small or as large a governance structure as desired.
Modem trust law can easily accommodate a charitable trust having a corpo-
rate board/management structure. At the same time, a one-member board of
a corporate charity runs many of the oversight risks of a single-trusteed
charity, particularly when the fiduciary performs all the management func-
tions himself or herself.92 As discussed next, recommended "best prac-
tices"--and some aspects of corporate law for certain (generally large)
corporations-require that those who provide governance not be the same
persons as those who provide management.
2. "Independent" Fiduciaries
The duty of loyalty is often expressed by the principle that good gov-
ernance generally requires fiduciaries who lack incentives or relationships
that would compromise their ability to make objective decisions based on
the best interests of the charity, rather than on the personal interests of the
fiduciaries. This principle actually comprises two distinct concepts: inde-
pendence and (usually financial) disinterest. Like all principles, however,
neither of these components can realistically be absolute.
a. Independence vs. Accountability
First, independence itself has two components. 93 The first-what
might be called external independence-is neither required nor desirable,
and indeed might constitute lack of accountability to key constituents.
94
91. Missouri Attorney General's Office, Attorney General Jay Nixon, Attorney General's Review
and Recommendations Regarding the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, pt. 6 (Mar. 2004), at
http://www.ago.state.mo.us/newsreleases/2004/kauffmanreport030404.htm.
92. while the organizer could set up the charity as a membership corporation with himself or
herself as the sole member, the board of directors cannot be easily neutered. See Carolyn C. Clark &
Glenn M. Troost, Forming a Foundation: Trust vs. Corporation, 3 PROB. & PROP. 32 (May/June 1989);
Dana Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Duties: Defining the Duties of Parent Corporations
Acting as Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit Health Care Systems, 53 RUTGERS L. REv. 979 (2001).
93. Compare ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 66, § 1.34 cmt. b, at 36
(cautioning that "[it has long been common to emphasize a distinction between 'inside' and 'outside'
directors, without clarifying the precise meaning of those terms").
94. See generally Evelyn Brody, Accountability and Public Trust, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT
AMERICA 471 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). See also ABA Coordinating Comm. on Nonprofit Gov-
ernance, Guide to Current and Emerging Standards of Nonprofit Corporate Governance: Governing and
Best Practices in the Wake of Sarbanes-Oxley (draft Mar. 2005), observing:
Certain aspects of the independent director principle may not make organizational sense for
some kinds of nonprofit organizations.... For instance, should a private foundation that re-
ceives all of its money from the largesse of a single family be required to have a majority of
persons on the foundation board who are not part of such family? .... Should a start-up arts
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Notably, the founders set forth organizational and operational terms in the
organic documents. The donor may properly impose restrictions on the
charity's discretion to use gifts, and major donors often are named as trus-
tees or elected to the board of directors. If provided for, members of the
organization may exercise influence through their election of the governing
board, and through their participation in decisions to take certain extraordi-
nary transactions. Despite these legitimate constraints, though, the fiduciar-
ies must be free to exercise their judgment in the best interests of the
organization. 95 As difficult as managing these conflicts are, though, they do
not vary by the legal form of the charity. By contrast, the size of the board
of directors or the number of trustees (as described above) and the compo-
sition of the board may determine the degree to which the organization is
more responsive to one or another of its constituencies.
b. Separation of Oversight and Management
The second-what might be called internal independence-looks for a
separation between oversight and management. 96 The ALI's draft Princi-
or community organization, founded and funded by a group of close friends or neighbors,
immediately expand its board to admit persons who are strangers to them and their organiza-
tion's goals? In such cases, the best interests of the organization and its fundamental mission
may lie in not having a majority of "independent" directors.
Id. at 38-39 (emphasis in original).
95. The ABA draft advises:
For most nonprofit organizations, however, having a majority of independent directors is not
only a good idea, but a reality. ... , Even nonprofit organizations that determine that having a
majority of independent directors is not appropriate for them should look at the underlying
premises of the independent-directors principle and determine whether their organizations
meet the spirit of such principle. That is, do board members look with objectivity at the in-
formation provided by management, ask good questions at board meetings, and take inde-
pendent responsibility for the corporation's overall success or failure?
ABA COORDINATING COMM. ON NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE, supra note 95, at 39-40.
96. The ABA draft explains why applying the principle of board independence might not be easy
for a nonprofit organization:
1. Deference to Management.... Given the different compositions and expectations of
nonprofit boards, the standards by which nonprofit corporations detennine whether directors
are able to exercise an independent mindset may differ from those used by public companies.
First of all, most nonprofit directors are unpaid, and may not feel they have sufficient time to
review detailed corporate information to the degree expected of public-company directors
who receive substantial compensation for their board commitment....
Another nonprofit-specific independence issue arises from the fact that some nonprofit
directors are also substantial contributors and/or fundraisers. That status may give them a
proprietary-type interest in the corporation, and lead to close scrutiny of management per-
formance. Altematively, it may lead them to view their board role as primarily a source of fi-
nancial support rather than an independent overseer.
2. Board Culture Issues.... There may be a fundamental sense of trust, and a culture of
consensus, among board members and management, that seems satisfying and productive for
the organization. Thus, some nonprofits may feel that applying public-company-type stan-
dards regarding the role and responsibilities of independent directors could result in a loss,
rather than enhancement, of board effectiveness.
Id. at 37-38.
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pies of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations suggest: "overriding interests
of public policy.., generally require the governing board to: ... adopt and
execute processes conducive to the exercise of independent, informed over-
sight by a group of individuals separate from management .... ,,97
c. Financial and Other Conflicts
Finally, we come to the possibility that the fiduciaries themselves face
conflicts of interest. These may be financial or nonfinancial, although the
law is fairly undeveloped regarding nonfinancial conflicts of interest, such
as when a board member suffers a conflict of attention or loyalty that pre-
vents him or her from acting in the best interests of the organization.
Commonly, the focus is on whether the decision maker is compensated for
or otherwise obtains a direct financial benefit because of his or her position
with the organization. Note that in many charities, in addition to volunteer
directors, the officers themselves are uncompensated (whether or not the
organization also engages professional staff).
As in the case of independence generally, discussed above, conflicts
of interest cannot always (and often should not) be eliminated. Instead, as
recommended in the draft Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organiza-
tions, the board should "adopt and execute processes to minimize the ad-
verse consequences to the charity from conflicts of interest that might exist
between fiduciaries and the charity." 98 When structural independence is not
completely achievable-or even desirable-the benefits to the organization
of independent decision making can be obtained through such mechanisms
as appointing standing or ad hoc committees with independent members,
and holding meetings of the governing board without the participation of
the interested members. (Under federal tax rules, too, the appropriate deci-
sion makers might be less than the full board. 99) This is obviously not a
97. ALI, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2, supra note 9, § 3A.l(b) (Autonomy and Public
Policy Limitations), at 207.
98. Id- Moreover, it is important to identify when one or more fiduciaries is "interested" in gov-
ernance generally or in a specific transaction or conduct. As to a particular transaction or conduct, the
interested fiduciary must make appropriate disclosures and refrain from participating in the board's
decision.
99. Internal Revenue Code section 4941 prohibits self-dealing between a private foundation and
its fiduciaries, substantial contributors, and other disqualified persons, but provides an exception for
reasonable compensation. I.R.C. § 4941(d)(2)(E) (2000). For pblic charities, Code section 4958 im-
poses "intermediate sanctions" on self-dealing fiduciaries who engage in "excess benefit transactions"
with the charity. I.R.C. § 4958 (2000). The Treasury Department regulations under section 4958 apply a
presumption of reasonableness for a potentially excess benefit transaction between the charity and a
disqualified person, if the transaction was approved in advance by an independent decision-making
body acting in good faith (requiring the interested party to make appropriate disclosure and abstain from
the decision making, and the decision maker to document the grounds for deciding that the transaction
was fair to the charity).
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solution for charities lacking unconflicted board members or trustees. Trust
law permits a court to appoint a trustee for a limited purpose, but such a
device raises difficulties. 100 (The same would be true when a court appoints
a director ad litem.)
This still leaves the question of whether compensated executives
should also have seats on the governing board (or on particular committees
of the board). A few states require that a majority of directors of a nonprofit
corporation be financially disinterested.' 01 The ABA's Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act offers such a provision as optional section 8.13,
commenting:
This section is optional as many members of the Subcommittee ... felt
that its provisions would be ineffective in preventing intentional abuses,
while presenting a burdensome or inconvenient requirement.... Legiti-
mate public benefit corporations might have difficulty in finding active
100. Professor Halbach suggests clarifying the mechanism of appointing trustees for a limited
period of time or special purpose:
Apart from issues about selection and removal procedures, and general concerns over
circumstances that increase risks of trustees abusing their positions, the trust law needs to de-
velop clearer and better rules and alternatives, without necessarily punitive undertones, for the
temporary or limited substitution of temporary or special trustees, or trustees ad litem. Such
substitution for regular trustees should be used judiciously, and often mercifully, when and to
the extent this appears conducive to the sound administration or representation of the
trust....
Halbach, supra note 27, at ix. See also Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate: What Is the
LR.S. Role in Charity Governance?, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 537, 538 n.5 (1999) [hereinafter Brody, A
Taxing Time for Bishop Estate].
Not only was it unprecedented (to my knowledge) for a judge to appoint special-purpose trus-
tees to handle the tax issues while leaving the regular trustees in place, but also one can only
speculate about how this arrangement might have played out. What does it mean to have one
set of trustees for the "real" issues and another set for the tax issues? Are we to assume not
only that the special-purpose trustees kept the regular trustees in the dark about the IRS pro-
ceeding, but also that the regular trustees kept the special-purpose trustees in the dark about
ongoing KSBE matters? What if these KSBE matters-like investment decisions and com-
pensation issues--could give rise to fresh violations of tax requirements? See generally Spe-
cial Purpose Trustees' Report, Apr. 27, 1999 (describing the Special Purpose Trustees' belief
that they lack the authority to meet IRS demands to: (1) remove the incumbent trustees; (2)
control or determine the method for selecting new trustees; (3) limit the compensation paid to
the trustees in the 1999 fiscal year; and (4) prevent the removal of assets from KSBE and sub-
sidiaries beyond the supervision of the court and the IRS)....
101. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227 (West Supp. 2004) (requiring that charity managers may make
up no more than 49% of the board positions). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-B, § 713-a(2) (West
Supp. 2003) ("No more than 49% of the individuals on the board of directors of a public benefit corpo-
ratio nmay be financially interested persons."); Donald E. Quigley, The Rules for Managing Nonprofit
Corporations Are Changing Fast: Maine Has New Statutory Requirements for Governance. Manage-
ment, and Asset Transfers, ME. BAR J., Summer 2002, at 156. Cf N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292:6-a
(Board of Directors of Charitable Nonprofit Corporations) (2004) (requiring charitable corporations to
have "at least 5 voting members, who are not of the same immediate family or related by blood or
marriage," but prohibiting exemptions for private foundations and churches). Mandating a majority of
disinterested directors, though, might simply lead to dummy outside directors. See James J. Fishman,
Standards of Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7 PACE L. REV. 389, 448 n.252 (1987).
See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence Standards, 30 SEC.
REG. L.J. 370 (2002).
20051
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
and competent directors who had no financial interest in the
corporation. 
102
d. Requirements for Tax Exemption
The Internal Revenue Service, which administers the regime of tax
exemption under Internal Revenue Code section 501 (c)(3) and other provi-
sions, is in the process of issuing guidance on governance.
10 3
3. Conclusion as to Organizational Form
Structure, rather than standards, is often the appropriate focus of con-
cern. While the full ability of co-trustees to act like a corporate board is
uncertain in the absence of direction in the trust instrument, and while too
large a board raises governance problems of its own, both single-director
and single-trusteed charities seem to invite failures of proper independence
and protection of the public interest. Recent decisions by the Delaware
courts have begun to expand on the requirement that the duty of care be
carried out in "good faith."1 04 This development is far from satisfactorily
developed, however. Better might be to make size and independence mat-
ter-perhaps by shifting the burden of proof to the small or nonindependent
fiduciaries to demonstrate their exercise of care. We turn next to enforce-
ment issues.
C. Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties
1. By Regulators
Every state attorney general enjoys the role known as "parens pa-
triae"-inherited from the English view of the sovereign as father of the
country-to oversee the performance of charitable trusts and their fiduciar-
ies. 105 Attorney general oversight extends, generally, to those nonprofit
corporations that are charities. 106 Two observers cite to "increasing use of
102. RMNCA, supra note 10, § 8.13* (Financially Disinterested Majority-Public Benefit Corpo-
rations) (*optional section) cmt.
103. See also, e.g., Michael W. Peregrine & Bernadette M. Broccolo, "Independence" and the
"'EO" Governing Board. A General Counsel's Guide, EXEMPT ORG. L. REV., Sept. 2003, at 379.
104. See John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, "Good Faith" and the Ability of Directors to Assert
§ 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication,
Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. I 11 (2004).
105. See generally FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13, at
301,329-30.
106. See generally Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity
Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937 (2004).
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charitable trust laws to effect remedies that are unavailable under nonprofit
corporation law" (as well as resistance to applying the business judgment
rule in the nonprofit context, and even asserting "waste" of corporate as-
sets).' 0 7 State statutes on charity regulation differ as to the authority spe-
cifically granted to the attorney general. 108 Despite any enforcement
differences by form at the state level, at the federal level, the Internal
Revenue Service administers the same requirements of tax exemption un-
der Code section 501(c)(3) regardless of the exempt charity's organiza-
tional form.
2. By Co-Fiduciaries
While few private parties have standing to complain about the per-
formance of charity fiduciaries, universally a co-fiduciary is recognized to
have standing. Standing, however, is not the same thing as obligation. Trust
doctrine contains a duty to prevent a breach of trust by a co-fiduciary: How
does this duty operate in the context of an operating charity?
The provision of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts relating to the
standing and enforcement duties of co-trustees is currently being drafted.
As to standing, the Second Restatement provides: "A suit for the enforce-
ment of a charitable trust can be maintained by one or more of several trus-
tees against the other trustees." 109 The draft Third Restatement provides:
"Each trustee also has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee
from committing a breach of trust and, if a breach of trust occurs, to obtain
redress."' 10
107. Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, Key Nonprofit Corporate Law Developments in
2001, 11 BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 272, 272 (Feb. 14, 2002).
108. See FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13, at 311-21
("Statutes Enhancing Attorney General's Enforcement Powers").
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. b (1959).
110. Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 81(2) (Duty With Re-
spect to Co-Trustees), at 287. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 224(2) (1959), which
provides, in part:
A trustee is liable to the beneficiary, if he
(a) participates in a breach of trust committed by his co-trustee; or
(c) approves or acquiesces in or conceals a breach of trust committed by his co-
trustee; or
(d) by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the administration ofthe trust has en-
abled his co-trustee to commit a breach of trust; or
(e) neglects to take proper steps to compel his co-trustee to redress a breach of trust.
(Presumably in the case of a charitable trust, liability runs to the charity.) The examples that follow
relate either to the investment or management of trust assets. The fourth, illustrating clause (d), pro-
vides:
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Recall, however, from above that the board of trustees of a charitable
trust generally acts by majority vote. Can an outvoted trustee assert that the
majority trustees breached their duty of care? A comment to the section of
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts authorizing the exercise of power by co-
trustees provides:
These statutory provisions and the rule of this Section ordinarily
protect a dissenting trustee from liability for an act authorized by the ma-
jority, while preserving the co-trustee's duty normally to participate in
deliberations and decisionmaking and to act reasonably to prevent a
breach of trust. 1 II
Instead of merely requiring the trustee to act "reasonably," the Uniform
Trust Code adds the word "serious" to the situations requiring trustee ac-
tion against another: "(g) Each trustee shall exercise reasonable care to: (1)
prevent a cotrustee from committing a serious breach of trust; and (2) com-
pel a trustee to redress a serious breach of trust."
1 12
The foregoing rules are relatively simple to apply in the context of a
private trust or a charitable trust or corporation that simply invests assets
and makes distributions as directed by the settlor. However, in the context
of governing an operating charity, granting standing to any trustee (or di-
rector) of a charity risks raising a circularity problem: To allow suit by an
outvoted fiduciary confounds the general principle, described above, that
the organization is to be governed by the majority of the board. A duty
imposed on one fiduciary to sue another raises the following issues:
113
4. A and B are co-trustees. A improperly permits B to have the sole custody and man-
agement of the trust property and makes no inquiry as to his conduct. B is thereby enabled to
sell the trust property and embezzle the proceeds. A is liable for breach of trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 224 illus. to cl, (d) (1959).
111 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 39 cmt. a (2003). The Third Restatement provides the
following Illustration 1:
I A trust has five trustees. Three of them join in a conveyance of land belonging to the
trust. Absent a contrary provision in the trust, such as one stating that the trustees "shall act by
unanimous vote," the conveyance is valid. If the conveyance is a breach of trust, the two trus-
tees who did not join in it will not be liable, unless they failed to act reasonably to prevent the
breach of trust, such as by failing to bring suit to prevent or set aside the conveyance....
Id. § 39 cmt, a, illus. I. See also FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra
note 13, at 146-47 ("A trustee who refuses to join with the majority in an action that constitutes a
breach of trust is not liable for the consequences of the majority action, but he may have a duty to apply
to the court to prevent the action-") (footnote omitted).
112. UNIF TRUST CODE § 703(g) (2003). The draft Third Restatement instead comments "it might
be 'reasonable' for a trustee to decide not to bring suit to redress a breach of trust .... " Restatement
(Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 81 cmt. on subsec. (2) e (Whether trustee liable
for breach of trust by co-trustee(s)), at 297-98.
113. See ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2, supra note 9, § 350 (Enforcement of Fiduciary
Duties) cmts. on subsec. (b) 2 (Enforcement by co-trustee or co-director), at 118-21, & rptr's notes 6-
12, at 125-31. See also Symposium Issue on the Bishop Fstate Controversy, 21 U. HAW.. L. REv.
(1999). In his Foreword to that issue, Edward Halbach addressed the duty to prevent or remedy
breaches of trust by the other co-trustees:
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* Assuming that the Uniform Trust Code threshold applies, what is a
"serious" breach of fiduciary duty?
* Must an objecting fiduciary sue, or is resigning enough? Permitted?
Required?
* Under what circumstances must the fiduciary go to the attorney gen-
eral and the court?
* When may the fiduciary go to the press?
* What happens if a fiduciary does nothing?
In a suit for breach of fiduciary duty initiated by a co-fiduciary, the
standing of the co-fiduciary should be more limited in a duty-of-care
charge than in a duty-of-loyalty charge, in order to minimize judicial in-
volvement in matters of business judgment.1 14 (Indeed, rare is the breach of
duty suit brought by a co-fiduciary that does not allege breach of the duty
of loyalty as well as breach of the duty of care.) Perhaps the recent expan-
sion of the fiduciary requirement of good faith, as is beginning to be articu-
lated by the Delaware courts, provides the solution. 115 In particular, in the
context of the nonprofit organization with a small, self-perpetuating gov-
The Bishop Estate controversies aptly illustrate the need to recognize flexibility in the
conduct deemed appropriate to discharge this duty, specifically, whether and at what stage
remedial action might reasonably involve initiating litigation, alerting the Attorney General
(or beneficiaries), or seeking publicity to begin a process that will not prove futile or unduly
expensive.
Halbach, supra note 27, at x n.27.
Professor Halbach also addressed the issue of attorneys fees for a trustee who brings suit to
prevent or remedy a breach of trust by co-trustees: "Because of a dissenting or petitioning trustee's
legal duty in such matters, it would seem that the attorney fees are expenses ordinarily payable directly
from the trust estate, subject to recovery from a trustee who has acted in bad faith or without reasonable
cause." Id. at x. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Council Draft No. 4, supra note 22, § 88 (Power to
Incur and Pay Expenses) cmt. d (Costs ofjudicial proceedings), at 427-31.
114. For a case granting standing by minority directors in a duty of care claim, see, for example,
Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 936 n.4 (Cal. 1964) ("We do not
reach the question whether minority directors of a private [business] corporation can bring an action in
behalf of the corporation. The differences between private and charitable corporations make the consid-
eration of such an analogy valueless.") (citation omitted). But see id. at 939-41 (McComb, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that "[t]he affairs of either a private corporation or a charitable corporation are
managed by a majority of the board of directors or board of trustees of the corporation"); Nugent ex rel.
Lingard v, Harris, 184 A.2d 783, 785-86 (R.I. 1962) (affirming the trial judge's finding that a minority
of directors may not secure removal of the majority in the absence of mismanagement as opposed to a
difference of opinion).
Harry Henn and Jeffrey Boyd observe: "Analogous New York case law probably would bar
the derivative action if a disinterested quorum or committee of directors exercises its business judgment
and determines that the maintenance of the action is against the best interests of the corporation." Harry
G_ Henn & Jeffrey H. Boyd, Statutory Trends in the Law of Nonprofit Organizations: California, Here
We Come!, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1103, 1123-24 (1981). Accordingly, by contrast, "[d]emand might be
unnecessary if plaintiff shows, for example, that the demand would be futile because the complaint
implicates a majority of the board." Id. at 1123 n.159; accord RMNCA, supra note 10, § 6.30 off. cmit.
2, at 119 (noting that a demand on the board prior to bringing suit "would be useless, for example, if the
suit was against all the directors for entering into a conflict of interest transaction").
115. See Reed & Neiderman, supra note 104.
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erning board, "good faith" can be the vehicle that both constrains the domi-
nating fiduciaries and obligates the passive fiduciaries to act.1 16
Notably, in an influential case on the duty of a director of a business
corporation to take action against fellow board members, the New Jersey
Supreme Court declared:
Directors may not shut their eyes to corporate misconduct and then
claim that because they did not see the misconduct, they did not have a
duty to look. The sentinel asleep at his post contributes nothing to the en-
terprise he is charged to protect. 117
The court continued:
Upon discovery of an illegal course of action, a director has a duty to ob-
ject and, if the corporation does not correct the conduct, to resign.
In certain circumstances, the fulfillment of the duty of a director
may call for more than mere objection and resignation. Sometimes a di-
rector may be required to seek the advice of counsel.... Modem corpo-
rate practice recognizes that on occasion a director should seek outside
advice. A director may require legal advice concerning the propriety of
his or her own conduct, the conduct of other officers and directors or the
conduct of the corporation.... Sometimes the duty of a director may re-
quire more than consulting with outside counsel. A director may have a
duty to take reasonable means to prevent illegal conduct by co-directors;
in an appropriate case, this may include threat of suit. 
118
The court observed that "[u]sually a director can absolve himself from
liability by informing the other directors of the impropriety and voting for a
proper course of action." 119 However, in this case, the court held that the
director had a duty to do more, because the wrongdoing directors-the sons
of the defendant--"knew that she, the only other director, was not review-
ing their conduct; they spawned their fraud in the backwater of her neglect.
Her neglect of duty contributed to the climate of corruption; her failure to
act contributed to the continuation of that corruption."
1 20
116. See, e.g., Lynch v. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. RptT. 86 (1970), where the court surcharged
squabbling directors for permitting funds to accumulate in a noninterest-bearing account for five years,
rather than going to court for instruction. The Attorney General had charged:
"[A]li three directors in concentrating on their feud left the Foundation in a state of suspended
animation for several years ignoring their obligations to carry on its charitable purposes and
to manage its assets with the degree of care and diligence which a prudent man would exer-
cise in the management of his own affairs."
Id. at 92 (quoting a statement of the Attorney General). The nonobstructionist directors should have
gone to court to resolve the deadlock.
117. Francis v, United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981).
118. Id. at 823 (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 826 (citation omitted).
120. Id. at 829. The court continued:
Analysis of proximate cause is especially difficult in a corporate context where the allegation
is that nonfeasance of a director is a proximate cause of damage to a third party. Where a case
involves nonfeasance, no one can say "with absolute certainty what would have occurred if
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As to trusts, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts comments that a trustee
cannot resign out from under a problem without disclosure:
a trustee may not.., resign for the purpose of facilitating a breach of
trust by the remaining co-trustee(s) or of escaping adverse circumstances
without disclosing the breach or circumstances to the beneficiaries,
settlor, or court, as the case may be. That all trustee powers are subject to
a duty of good-faith exercise, see § 187 .... 121
3. Conclusion as to Organizational Form
While the line might be hard to draw, once again organizational form
seems less important than situations involving charities-trust or corpo-
rate-with very small boards, or with board members lacking appropriate
independence. In such a case, resignation might not be sufficient to dis-
charge an outvoted fiduciary's duties, but rather court relief might be re-
quired. In such as case, the court should be liberal in authorizing the
charity's advancing the fiduciary's attorneys' fees. If the fiduciary has an
interest in continuing to serve, an expanded board would prevent inappro-
priate domination and failure of governance from recurring. A fiduciary
who no longer wishes to take an active role in governance should seek
court approval to ensure that the assets of the charity are used properly,
even if the remedy involves winding up the charity and transferring its
assets to another charity that will carry out the wishes of the founders.
Consider the situation involving the Maddox Foundation, which pre-
sents an obvious case for finding a duty to bring suit. The Maddox Founda-
tion was established as a charitable trust in Tennessee and was
incorporated, after the 1998 death of its founders, in Mississippi. As re-
ported in the press, the two trustees chose Mississippi in which to incorpo-
rate in order for the two to continue as the only directors (Mississippi
permitting a nonprofit corporation to have as few as a single director, in
contrast to the minimum of three required in Tennessee).12
2
the defendant had acted otherwise." Nonetheless, where it is reasonable to conclude that the
failure to act would produce a particular result and that result has followed, causation may be
inferred. We conclude that even if Mrs. Pritchard's mere objection had not stopped the depre-
dations of her sons, her consultation with an attorney and the threat of suit would have de-
terred them. That conclusion flows as a matter of common sense and logic from the record.
Whether in other situations a director has a duty to do more than protest and resign is best left
to case-by-case determinations. In this case, we are satisfied that there was a duty to do more
than object and resign. Consequently, we find that Mrs. Pritchard's negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the misappropriations.
Id. (citations omitted).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 36 (Resignation of Trustee) emt. a (Terms of the trust)
(2003).
122. See Jay Hamburg, $100M Charity Caught in Tug of War, TENNESSEAN, Oct. 5, 2003, at Al.
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A complaint filed jointly by director Tommye Maddox Working and
the Tennessee district attorney general asserted that the other director,
Robin Costa, had breached her fiduciary duties. 123 The Complaint also
described provisions in the articles of incorporation of the Maddox Founda-
tion Corporation that:
provide Ms. Costa with extraordinary authority, including the ability to
act unilaterally without the consent of the other member(s) of the board
of directors. Until she is determined to "lack capacity by an appropriate
court of the State of Mississippi," Ms. Costa has the power that would
regularly be exercisable only by a board of directors.
124
Further, "'[t]he Board of Directors shall have no authority with respect to
Robin G. Costa to deprive her of, limit, or interfere with the exercise of the
powers reserved to her by the incorporators." ' ' 125 Director Working and the
district attorney general alleged other acts of "willful, wanton or gross neg-
ligence and/or misconduct" by Costa, including using foundation assets to
pay for her personal expenses, and sought, among other remedies, Costa's
removal "in order to prevent malversation, peculation and waste .... -126
The plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction assuring that Working can
continue serving on the board pending resolution of the case.
127 On Octo-
ber 1, 2004, the defendant, however, asserting lack of jurisdiction by the
Tennessee court, moved to dismiss the Tennessee attorney general as a
party, and to dismiss Working's claims. The Mississippi attorney general
then filed suit in Mississippi court and won a temporary restraining order to
enjoin any transfer of assets from Mississippi to Tennessee as may be or-
dered by a Tennessee court. 128 The Tennessee probate court diffused the
border clash, at least temporarily, by granting the plaintiffs an accounting
but not the appointment of a receiver and the return of the assets to Tennes-
123. Complaint 108, State of Tennessee v. Costa (7th Cir. Davidson County (Probate Div.)) (filed
Sept. 1, 2004) (No. 04P-1430).
124. Id. 39 (quoting Articles of Incorporation 80.
125. Id. (quoting Articles of Incorporation 8g).
126, d. at 108, l1, Separately, director Costa's use of foundation assets to acquire local sports
teams (which she operates) appears to violate federal tax limitations on "excess business holdings" of
private foundations. See I.R.C. § 4943 (2000).
127. Order on Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, State of Tennessee v. Costa, (7th Cir.
Davidson County (Probate Div.)) (Sept. 1, 2004) (No. 04P-1430) (on file with author). The court:
cnjoin[ed] Robin G. Costa, individually and as director of the Maddox Foundation, a Missis-
sippi non-profit corporation from: (a) removing and/or replacing Tommye Maddox Working
as a member of the Maddox Foundation Corporation's Board of Directors; and (b) appointing
someone other than Ms. Working to replace Ms. Working as a member of the Maddox Foun-
dation Corporation's Board of Directors.
Id.
128. Jay Hamburg, Mississippi Enters Fight over Charity, TENNFSSEAN, Nov. 22, 2004, at AL
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see. 129 Nevertheless, the Mississippi chancery court confirmed its TRO by
converting it to a preliminary injunction.130
D. Reform Proposals
I. State Level
Congress reacted to recent scandals of corporate governance in the
business sector by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,131 Not only
does this statute not apply to trusts, but also it applies, in general, only to
those corporations that are publicly traded and hence subject to the federal
securities laws. Notable provisions require executive certification of finan-
cial results, independent audit committees, and whistle-blower protections.
Private regulation is also imposing best practices. For example, the NASD
and New York Stock Exchange adopted rules for listed companies that
include a requirement that a majority of the board be uncompensated (ex-
cept for directors' fees). 13
2
While Sarbanes-Oxley thus does not apply to charities, Drexel Uni-
versity made headlines by voluntarily adopting many of the requirements
of Sarbanes-Oxley. 133 Marion Fremont-Smith comments:
The powers granted to officers and directors under nonprofit corpo-
ration enabling statutes are designed to encourage independence. They
affirm the ability of directors to delegate their duties, to establish com-
mittees, and to rely on their reports. They permit, but do not require, that
there be an executive committee. The same is true in regard to audit
committees, and, in fact, following passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
many charities voluntarily established them. 
134
129. Rob Johnson, Judge Wants Impartial Report on Charity, TENNESSEAN, Nov. 23, 2004, at B 1.
130. William C. Bayne, Court Shields Maddox-Foundation Will Remain "Status Quo" Pending
Accounting, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Nov. 30, 2004, at DS I. In issuing the injunction, the Mississippi
judge declared himself "about as nervous as an alligator in a catfish pond"-a response to the earlier
comment by the Tennessee judge that "it appeared that the chancellor down there in Hernando[, Missis-
sippi,] seems a little nervous." Id.
131. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
132. See NASD MANUAL Rule 4350 (c)(1) ("A majority of the board of directors must be com-
prised of independent directors as defined in Rule 4200 .... ), at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.htmlrbid=1189&record-id-1159003671 (last visited
Mar. 12, 2005); N.Y. STOCK EXCH., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LISTING STANDARDS § 303A (Nov. 3,
2004), at http://www.nyse.cors/pdfs/section303A-finalrules.pdf ("1. Listed companies must have a
majority of independent directors.").
133. See Memorandum from Tobey Oxholm, General Counsel to Drexel University, to National
Association of College and University Attorneys Colleagues (Mar. 10, 2003), at
http://www.nacua.org/documents/Drexel-Sarbanes-Oxley.Memo.doe. (This memorandum includes
links to board documents.)
134. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13, at 431.
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The desirability of extending some of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms to
the nonprofit sector is a subject of much debate and could influence the
choice of state of incorporation, if not the choice of form (as trust or corpo-
ration). 135 In early 2005 the New York attorney general released a set of
legislative proposals to amend the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law. 136 One
proposal purports to mandate an audit committee for organizations with
more than 25 board members, and audit committees would be required for
organizations having audited financial statements or more than $2 million
of revenue. The proposal, however, permits any not-for-profit corporation
to opt out of these requirements by amending its articles of incorpora-
tion.137 On September 30, 2004, the governor of California signed SB
1262, the Charity Integrity Act. Primarily directed to charitable solicita-
tions, SB 1262 also contains some governance provisions. In general, the
board or trustee of charities having at least $2 million in annual revenues
must: obtain audited financial statements, and make these publicly avail-
able; "[i]f it is a corporation, have an audit committee appointed by the
board of directors"; and "review and approve the compensation, including
benefits, of the president or chief executive officer and the treasurer or
chief financial officer to assure that it is just and reasonable." 138 In the
private sector, the new standards used by the BBB Wise Giving Alliance to
rate charities go much further: They recommend that no more than one
person who directly or indirectly receives compensation from the charity
should serve as a voting member of the board-and should not serve as
chairman or treasurer. 139
Beyond Sarbanes-Oxley, an area of particular concern is the corporate
procedure for approving interested transactions between the nonprofit and
the fiduciary. Professor Harvey Goldschmid endorses Professor Deborah
DeMott's proposal that an interested transaction must be fair to the corpo-
135. See, e.g., BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2003), available at http://www.independentsector.org/iss-
ues/sarbanesoxley html.
136. The four separate bills are available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/legislatin.html
(last visited Apr. 1,2005).
137. Attorney General's Legislative Program, Program Bill 68-05, § 3, at 4-6, at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/chari.pdf/ag68-05.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2004) (proposing new
subsections (f) and (g) to N-PCL § 712 (Executive committee and other committees)).
138. S.B. 1262 § 7, 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (amending section 12586 of the Government
Code). See generally Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law, supra note 6 (discussing California,
New York, and Massachusetts proposals).
139. See BBB Wise Giving Alliance, Standards for Charity Accountability, Standard 4 (Mar. 3,
2003), available at www.give-org/standards/; BBB Wise Giving Alliance, Implementation Guide: BBB
Wise Giving Alliance Standards for Charity Accountability, at 9 (Mar. 3, 2003), available at
www.give.org/standards/.
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ration, and that the court's review be governed under loyalty standards, not
the business judgment rule: 1
40
There is considerable strength in Professor DeMott's position. My
concerns about deferential judicial review include the following: (i) the
tendency of nonprofit directors to defer to each other in an environment
"not characterized by skepticism and analytical rigor;" (ii) the absence in
the nonprofit sector of "extensive [SEC] disclosure requirements, en-
forcement machinery and private litigation;" and (iii) the fact that non-
profit institutions generally lack voting rights, appraisal rights, and other
protections available in the for-profit sector that would lessen the dan-
gers, at least with respect to certain significant transactions.
14 1
Marion Fremont-Smith believes that, of all the suggestions to reform
the duty of loyalty, Professor Goldschmid's is "the most balanced and
likely to gain acceptance."' 142 While the burden of proof shifts to the inter-
ested party when an interested transaction has not been approved in accor-
dance with corporate procedures, the draft Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Organizations also recommends an enhanced standard of judicial
review for conflict-of-interest transactions that have been approved under
such procedures.1
43
140. Professor Goldschmid writes:
The difficult issue in the nonprofit context comes if, after proper disclosure, a facially
disinterested group of directors approves an interested director transaction or a conversion
transaction proposed by a minority of the directors on the board. If for-profit precedents are
used, most states would apparently apply the business judgment rule-and its highly deferen-
tial rationally believes test-to judicial review of these transactions. Professor DeMott, on the
other hand, proposes that such self-dealing transactions "be voidable unless the transaction's
proponents can affirmatively establish its fairness to the corporation at the time of the transac-
tion."
Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Prob-
lems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 648 (1998) (footnotes omitted, including a citation to
Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131,
143 (1993)).
141. Id. Specifically, Professor Goldschmid recommends:
two important modifications of duty of loyalty law as it would be applied in a for-profit con-
text. First, when there has been proper disclosure with respect to an interested transaction, or
another matter implicating the duty of loyalty, followed by disinterested approval, the highly
deferential rationally believes test of the business judgment rule should not be the standard for
judicial review. A fairness test, or at a minimum the ALI's intermediate test [in the Principles
of Corporate Governance], should provide the applicable standard of review. Similarly, re-
viewing courts should give enhanced scrutiny to allegations of conflict of interest or dominat-
ing influence in the nonprofit context. Business and financial relationships, familial
relationships, and "taints" to the process, for example, which might be considered of marginal
concern in the for-profit context, should be resolved in favor of review under loyalty stan-
dards rather than the business judgment rule when nonprofit institutions are involved.
Id. at 650-51 (footnotes omitted).
142. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13, at 436.
143. See ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 2, supra note 9, § 375 (Burden of Proof and
Standard of Review), at 181.
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2. Requirements for Federal Tax Exemption
a. Substantive Requirements
Congress might import additional governance rules into the Internal
Revenue Code. Senator Chuck Grassley has been using his position as
chair of the Senate Finance Committee to open a variety of investigations
into the functioning of the federal tax exemption, both the substantive rules
and compliance and enforcement. 144 In June 2004, the staff of the Senate
Finance Committee issued a discussion draft on the IRS role in charity
governance, proposing, among other things: applying private foundation
self-dealing rules to public charities; barring (or limiting) compensation
paid to trustees of nonoperating foundations; requiring that the chief execu-
tive officer (or equivalent officer) of a tax-exempt organization sign a dec-
laration under penalty of perjury that he or she has instituted procedures to
ensure that the organization's federal tax filings comply with the Internal
Revenue Code; for organizations with more than $250,000 in gross re-
ceipts, requiring audited financial statements; and, for charitable organiza-
tions with over $250,000 in gross receipts, requiring the Form 990 to
include "a detailed description of the organization's annual performance
goals and measurements for meeting those goals (to be established by the
Board of Directors) for the past year and goals for the coming year."'1 45
The Senate Finance Committee staff's discussion draft frequently
seems to assume that the organization takes the corporate form. In a section
called "Encourage Strong Governance and Best Practices for Exempt Or-
ganizations," the discussion draft begins: "A charitable organization shall
be managed by its board of directors or trustees (in the case of a charitable
trust). 1 46 A footnote to this sentence then states merely: "The duties of a
144. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-526, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING
MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS:
IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARITIES (Apr. 2002). See
generally Norman 1. Silber, Nonprofit [nterjurisdictonality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613 (2005).
145. SFC STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 67, at 10- See also an analysis of some of these
proposals, and of some additional tax proposals, by the STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
JCS-2-05, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES (Jan. 27, 2005),
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf.
146. SFC STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 67, at 12. See also the proposals that: "all com-
pensation that is subject to special IRS filing requirements must be approved annually and in advance
by the Board of Directors (excluding from the approval process those members of the Board who have a
conflict with respect to the compensation being considered)," id. at 5, and "[e]xempt organizations
would be required to report how often the Board of Directors met and how often the Board met, without
the CEO (or equivalent) present." Id. at 10. See also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS. & AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE: A RESOURCE FOR HEALTH CARE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS (Apr. 2003), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/040203CorpRespRsceGuide.pdf.
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board that are described in this paper would also be the duties of a trustee
for a charitable trust." 147 It is not clear, however, whether a charitable trust
with only one (or two) trustees could obtain tax exemption, in light of the
specific proposal that the:
Board shall be comprised of no less than three members and no greater
than fifteen. No more than one member may be directly or indirectly
compensated by the organization. Compensated members may not serve
as the board's chair or treasurer. For public charities, at least one board
member or one-fifth of the Board must be independent. A higher number
of independent board members might be required in limited cases. An
independent member would be defined as free of any relationship with
the corporation or its management that may impair or appear to impair
the director's ability to make independent judgments. 
14 8
Responses to the Senate Finance Committee staff s 2004 proposals,
too, generally focused on the corporate model of charity governance. For
example, the executive director of BoardSource, a nonprofit organization
devoted to improving charity board operations, occasionally used the term
"trustee" but clearly contemplated a corporate structure in making a pro-
posal for detailed disclosure of board procedures.
149
Finally, the federalism circle is closing: Beginning with Maine in
2002, the states are importing the federal tax prohibitions on excess benefit
147 SFC STAFF DISCUSSION DRAj--, supra note 67, at 12 n,15
148. Id. at 13 n. 17 (citing BBB Wise Giving Alliance, supra note 139, Standard 4 but omitting the
sentence "Compensated Board Members' shall not serve as the board's chair or treasurer"). See also
Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability, Seven Standards of Responsible Stewardship, Stan-
dard 2, available at http://www.ecfa.org/ContcntEngine.aspx?Page=7Standards (last visited Mar. 12,
2005).
149. The executive director of BoardSource, an organization devoted to improving nonprofit
governance, proposcd that the IRS supplement the publicly available Form 990 by requiring a govem-
ance disclosure form for charity boards. See Deborah S. Hechinger, A Simple Way to Help Nonprofit
Boards, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 5, 2004, at 45. She believes that: "Requiring board members to
fill out a disclosure form encourages better behavior without creating unintended consequences that
jeopardize board performance or discourage people from serving on nonprofit boards." Id. She recom-
mended that such a form ask-appropriate to the size and type of the responding organization-such
questions as:
* How many times did the board meet this year?
* How many times did the board meet in executive session?
* Was the chief executive officer present at all executive sessions?
* Does the board have term limits for trustees?
* Does the board have a rotation policy for board officers?
* How long has the current board chair been in that position?
* Does the board have a conflict-of-interest policy?
* Did the board review and approve the organization's budget?
* Does the board have an audit committee?
* Has the board engaged in a process to assess the board's performance in the past three
years?
* Did the board conduct a formal evaluation of the CEO's performance this year?
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transactions into nonprofit corporate codes. 150 The effect is to give the state
attorney general authority to enforce as fiduciaries prohibitions on cases of
insider private inurement or excess benefits that exceed the fair market
value of the property or services received by the charity.
b. Enforcement
The Senate Finance Committee staff's 2004 discussion draft includes
a proposal that the Internal Revenue Service should have equity powers
over exempt organizations.15 1 This echoes a proposal from 1969, when the
Treasury Department recommended to the Ways and Means Committee
that the IRS have the power to obtain equitable sanctions in district court to
enforce exempt-organization fiduciary duties. 152 The Treasury Department
had introduced this proposal with the following general description:
United States District Courts would be invested with (1) equity powers
(including, but not limited to, power to rescind transactions, surcharge
trustees and order accountings) to remedy any detriment to a philan-
thropic organization resulting from any violation of the substantive rules,
and (2) equity powers (including, but not limited to, power to substitute
trustees, divest assets, enjoin activities and appoint receivers) to ensure
that the organization's assets are preserved for philanthropic purposes
and that violations of the substantive rules will not occur in the future.
153
150. 2001 Me. Laws ch. 550. Maine's lead is being followed in proposed legislation in New York
and in Massachusetts. See generally Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law, supra note 6. Marion
Fremont-Smith explains:
By incorporating the prohibitions against private benefit in section 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code and the limitations on excess benefit transactions in section 4958, [the Maine
provisions] gave the state grounds for enforcing federal standards much as had been the case
in connection with the adoption of restrictions on private foundations enacted in 1969. Fur-
thermore, they addressed for the first time in state law the problems then being faced by the
IRS in attempting to regulate joint ventures between charitable and for-profit investors. These
provisions lay the groundwork for increased cooperation between the [Internal Revenue] Ser-
vice and state attorneys general, a development much desired by both government entities al-
though much limited in application.
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 13, at 231 (footnote omitted).
Compare, following the imposition of restrictions on private foundations by the Tax Reform Act of
1969, section 1 .50 (Private Foundations) in the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, the purpose
of which "was to provide state attorneys general with sanctions that could be enforced in state courts as
a complement to the federal sanction of loss of tax exemption." Id. at 167.
151. SFC STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFr, supra note 67, at 16-17.
152. See Treasury Proposals to Improve Private Philanthropy (Treas. Dept. News Release Jan. 18,
1977), [197719 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 6156, at 70,850-57 (Jan. 26, 1977).
153. id. at Technical Explanation, part I.C.L.b(2)(a), at 70,855 (Improving the Philanthropic
Process, Enforcement Procedures, Alternative Sanctions, Treasury Proposal, Detailed Description,
Equity Powers), This proposal specified that the federal courts would defer to any state equitable pro-
ceedings:
In the event that appropriate State authorities institute action against a philanthropic organiza-
tion or individuals based upon acts which constitute a violation of substantive rules of law ap-
plicable to such an organization, the United States District Court before whom the federal
civil action is instituted or was pending would be required to defer action on any equitable re-
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Congress did not enact these 1977 proposals. However, it should be
appreciated that explicit statutory remedies have never been the IRS's only
weapon: The agency can use and has used the threat of revocation of ex-
emption to exact specific management changes in the course of negotiating
"closing agreements" that ensure future compliance-including reduced
compensation, repayment of amounts improperly obtained or expended,
and the adoption of a compensation committee structure or other govern-
ance changes. In the most recent notorious case where this occurred, the
Bishop Estate, the charity was a trust. 
154
The Senate Finance Committee staff s discussion draft also proposes
that "[a]ny director/trustee (at the time of bringing the proceeding) may
bring a proceeding"-although the proposal does not specify whether the
issue must be one relating to tax exemption. In describing demand on the
board as a prerequisite to suit and the availability of expenses (including
legal fees) for a successful prosecution, the discussion draft cites to existing
corporate law. 155
3. Conclusion as to Organizational Form
Possible state and federal corporate legislation opens the door for op-
portunistic charity fiduciaries to select a less-regulated regime. If policy
makers focus on nonprofit corporation law, charities might prefer to form
as trusts. If states vary on their substantive or structural requirements, fo-
lief for protection of the organization or preservation of its assets for its philanthropic pur-
poses until conclusion of the State court action. At the conclusion of the State court action,
the District Court could consider the State action adequate or provide further equitable relief,
consistent with the State action, as the case warrants. However, no action by a State court
would defer or abate the imposition of the initial Federal excise taxes for the violations.
Id. at part 1 .C. 1.b.(2)(c), at 70,856.
154. See the Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate closing agreement, which the IRS insisted be
placed on the Web (go to http://www.ksbecdu/newsroom/filings/toc.html#closing). This agreement
required, in addition to a payment from KSBE to the IRS of $9 million plus interest (for a total of about
$14 million), the permanent removal of the incumbent trustees; the reorganization of KSBE around a
chief executive officer to carry out the policy decisions of the board of trustees; the adoption of an
investment policy and a spending policy focused on education; adoption of a conflicts-of-interest policy
and adherence to the probate court's directive for setting trustee compensation; a ban on hiring any
govemmental employee or official until three years after termination of governmental service; and the
Internet posting of the final closing agreement and of KSBE financial statements for the next five years.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ESTATE OF BERNICE PAUAttl BISHOP, ALSO
KNOWN AS, KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS BISHoP ESTATE, CLOSING AGREEMENT ON FINAL
DETERMINATION COVERING SPECIFIC MATrERS (Aug. 18, 1999), available at
http://www.ksbe.edu/newsroom/filings/toc.html#closing. See generally Brody, A Taxing Time for
Bishop Estate, supra note 100.
155. SFC STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 67, at 17 & n.24 ("See generally Cal. Corp. Code
Section 5142 (allowing, inter alia, officers and directors to bring an action against a charitable trust) as
well as the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) Section 6.30 Derivative Suits (allowing
directors and members to bring derivative suits).").
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rum-shopping will result. Notably, organizers might choose a particular
state in which to form based on the ease of formation and ongoing regula-
tion, the absence of a requirement that a majority of directors be financially
disinterested, or the availability of the limited liability company form for
charity. Already an issue of growing importance is the role of state authori-
ties when the charity incorporates in one state but operates in another state.
Typically, the state of operation requires the foreign charity to register if it
"does business" or owns assets in the state. The degree of state oversight
over the "internal affairs" of foreign charities, however, remains largely
untested in the courts.
CONCLUSION
The fiduciary standards for trustees of charitable trusts and for direc-
tors of corporate charities are more similar than commonly believed. Of
course, as long as differences remain between organizational forms and
among states, charity organizers will exploit the ability to choose.
As a separate matter, however, the nonprofit sector has itself been coa-
lescing around good governance practices that go beyond the minimum
requirements of law. These "best practices" rely to a large degree on struc-
tural protections. The corporate model of governance and accountability
looks to a well-informed, independent board, of minimum size, acting in
good faith and without impermissible conflicts of interest. Trust instru-
ments may set forth provisions for governing charitable trusts that adopt the
corporate board/management structure. In general, to ensure appropriate
accountability and good governance, the typical operating charity should
take the corporate form, or, if a trust, should have a governing board and
executive structure similar to that of a nonprofit corporation.
The time might have come for the law of charity governance to reward
these structural protections. A charitable trust with a single trustee or lack-
ing separation of oversight and management should-like the nonprofit
corporation without appropriate controls-be subject to closer scrutiny to
determine whether the governing board and its members met their fiduciary
duty. Moreover, the smaller the number of trustees or corporate board, the
greater should be the obligation on a fiduciary to initiate action against
another who breaches the duty of loyalty or otherwise acts in bad faith. As
described above, for boards of business corporations, recent Delaware ju-
risprudence holds that bad faith renders unavailable a waiver or exculpation
of traditional fiduciary duties. However, the burden generally still falls on
the plaintiff to prove causation and damages from a director's bad faith
breach. The burden of proof shifts to the defendant only in cases of breach
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of the duty of loyalty, and only if the interested director has not made ap-
propriate disclosure or obtained approval. Is there a workable way for the
law-at least in the case of fiduciaries of charities with small or conflicted
boards-to require that, in a bona fide allegation that a fiduciary has
breached the duty of care by acting in bad faith, the burden of proof should
shift to that fiduciary to show absence of harm to the charity?

